No Free For Lunch No Barter For Death

Perdana Menteri (PM) Australia Tonny Abbott menyatakan eksekusi mati terhadap warganya merupakan tindakan "barbar". Tak puas disitu Tony bersikap "childish" seperti barter mainan ungkit Bantuan Tsunami dengan Gembong Bali Nine, Andrew Chan dan Myuran Sukumaran, ini bermakna jelas "there is no free lunch". Puncaknya kemarin pagi tanggal 18 Februari 2015 berlangsung demo besar-besaran di pusat kota Melbourne oleh ratusan praktisi hukum antara lain dihadiri hakim agung negara bagian Victoria, Lex Lasry, yang dalam tiga pekan terakhir menemui Chan dan Sukumaran di LP Kerobokan. Demo juga akan diteruskan di berbagai kota hingga malam hari. Selain itu, Sekjen PBB Ban Ki-moon juga meminta pemerintah Indonesia membatalkan pelaksanaan eksekusi mati para terpidana kasus narkotika tersebut.
Tampaknya kehebohan ini sebenarnya wajar dan harus dilihat biasa biasa saja meskipun disana Australia sudah berteriak SOS tetapi Indonesia sebaliknya mempunyai integritas hukum dan kedaulatan yang tidak bisa diintervensi oleh siapapun termasuk oleh Sekjen PBB. Alasan Jokowi Indonesia dalam keadaan Darurat Narkoba jangan dipandang enteng itu adalah sinyal terkuat tahun 2015 dari seorang Pemimpin Dunia yang justru seharusnya diikuti seluruh pemimpin dunia lainnya, seperti halnya Obama menjadikan terorisme menjadi musuh utama dunia lainnya! Lalu mengapa mereka tak bereaksi keras dalam pemberantasan terorisme yang sama juga menghukum mati pelakunya. Apa bedanya dengan hukuman mati terhadap Gembong Narkoba? Bedanya tipis hanya soal formalistik tetapi hasilnya sama juga yaitu "aksi mencabut nyawa". Bahkan US mengenal Hukuman Mati. Dahulu mungkin Tony Abbot bisa bermain mata dengan kewenangan Grasi Presiden SBY dan Menkumham dimotori wakilnya Denny Indrayana untuk mengakali Hukum Positif yang berlaku di Indonesia. Tapi dunia kini harus tahu Jokowi berbeda, profilnya memang tak meyakinkan tapi nyali dan tindakannya sangat menggetarkan maka tidak mengherankan pada waktunya nanti sudah seharusnya semua menjadi follower Jokowi dalam pemberantasan Narkoba secara Internasional!
Di dalam negeri kita pasti berpendapat gencarnya Koalisi Anti Hukuman Mati di Indonesia dinilai aneh juga. Mereka mendesak Pemerintah untuk menyetop hukuman mati tetapi sementara dasar legitimasi hukum positif kita sangatlah kuat. Dan mereka lupa Menlu RI Retno sangat memahami bahwa dalam case ini Hukum Internasional hanyalah sub-ordinary dari Hukum Nasional sebab HI tidak mempunyai Law Body Making atas Hukuman Mati yang diterapkan oleh hukum nasional suatu negara. Namun tak bijaksana juga bila kita tidak melongok apa sih yang melatarbelakangi gerakan koalisi anti hukuman mati di Indonesia?
VERSI KOALISI HRWG
Di Tanah air gayung bersambut Koalisi Anti Hukuman Mati yang tergabung di dalam Human Right Working Grup (HRWG), Imparsial, Setara Institute, ICJR (Institute for Criminal Justice Reform), LBH, Kontras dan ELSAM menolak keras hukuman mati di Indonesia dan mengecam pernyataan Menlu RI Retno Marsudi bahwa hukuman mati sesuai dengan Hukum Internasional. Koalisi inipun merelease alasan penolakan mereka atas hukuman mati gelombang II. Khususnya menolak Putusan MK 21 Oktober 2008 karena dianggap terjebak positivisme hukum formal. Seperti kita ketahui Putusan MK 2008 itu menegaskan bahwa tata cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati di Indonesia adalah menurut UU No.2/Pnps/1964 tentang Tata Cara Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati yang merupakan lex specialis yang menegasikan pasal 11 KUHAP. Lebih lanjut, MK menyatakan UU No. 2/Pnps/1964 tentang Tata Cara Pelakasaan Hukuman Mati yang dijatuhkan oleh Pengadilan di Lingkungan Peradilan Umum dan Militer tidak bertentangan dengan Pasal 28I ayat (1) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945.
Direktur Eksekutif Elsam, Indriaswati Dyah Saptaningrum, mengatakan Putusan MK ini secara nyata telah mengabaikan perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan hukum dan peraturan perundang-undangan di Indonesia yang telah mengalami perubahan paradigma sebagaimana terlihat dalam RUU KUHP yang sudah menempatkan hukuman mati sebagai pidana yang bersifat khusus dan diancamkan secara alternatif. Pidana mati dapat dijatuhkan secara bersyarat, dengan memberikan masa percobaan, sehingga dalam tenggang waktu masa percobaan tersebut terpidana diharapkan dapat memperbaiki diri sehingga pidana mati tidak perlu dilaksanakan. Demikian juga dengan Statuta Roma Mahkamah Pidana Internasional (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998) yang rencananya akan diratifikasi Pemerintah Indonesia sama sekali tidak mengatur mengenai ancaman pidana mati. Hukuman dalam mekanisme International Criminal Court juga hanya berupa hukuman penjara yang terdiri dari hukuman penjara seumur hidup untuk kejahatan yang sangat serius dan hukuman penjara maksimum 30 tahun.
Disamping itu menurut Koalisi ini, penerapan hukuman mati bertentangan dengan ketentuan hukum hak asasi manusia Internasional yang secara tegas menyatakan hukuman mati bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip yang diatur di dalam konvenan Internasional Hak-hak Sipil dan Politik (International in Civil and Political Rigts-ICCPR.). Hak untuk hidup (rights to life) - yaitu pada bagian III Pasal 6 (1) - menyatakan bahwa setiap manusia berhak atas hak untuk hidup dan mendapatkan perlindungan hukum dan tiada yang dapat mencabut hak itu. Perlu diingat bahwa prinsip-prinsip yang diatur dalam ICCPR telah menjadi bagian dari hukum nasional Indonesia, melalui UU No.12 Tahun 2005 tentang Ratifikasi Kovenan Hak-hak Sipil dan Politik. Pertimbangan lain, menurutnya, adalah perkembangan mutakhir dalam konteks pemidanaan bagi terpidana. "Kalau dulu praktek pemidanaan berdasarkan pada restributive justice. Jadi orang dihukum sebagai sebuah tindakan balasan atas ketidakadilan yang dilakukan atau kejahatan yang dilakukan. Kalau zaman purba, kan, mata ganti mata, nyawa ganti nyawa. Lalu berkembang lagi tapi masih dengan prinsip yang sama kalau mata seseorang tidak bisa diambil dia lalu dipenjara saja! Benarkah Demikian?
SUMMARY
Secara ideologi prinsip HAM, maka gerakan Koalisi ini sangat baik dan dapat diterima secara umum namun mereka tengah berhadapan dengan integritas hukum dan kedaulatan negara RI. Hukum HAM Internasional memang melarang (tetapi tidak absolut) hukuman mati. Namun dalam kasus tertentu HI sebaliknya menyerahkan sepenuhnya pelaksanaannya kepada Hukum Nasional. Aksi protes pemimpin dunia memang cukup keras tetapi sedikit mengundang kelucuan karena itu sebenarnya dilakukan semata mata pencitraan politik dalam negeri-nya. Lihatlah nanti apakah mereka juga ngambek menolak hadir memenuhi undangan Jokowi dalam Asian African Commemoration Indonesia ke 60? Meski masih berupa riak riak ternyata akibat datangnya kecaman bertubi-tubi dari Brazil, Perancis, dan aksi heroik PM Australia Tony Abbot justru malah memancing spontanitas nasionalisme bagi publik dan rakyat Indonesia! Tony! don't judge our path if you never path our journey as a nation, so it's okay no free for lunch but no barter for death sir!!

Menguji Kebisingan Politik Dari Jualan Investasi Ke Kebijakan Alih Subsidi

Seperti diduga Jokowi dengan keberaniannya yang  tiada tara pada tanggal 17 Oktober 2014 mengeluarkan keputusan yang tak urung mencengangkan banyak orang yaitu menaikkan harga BBM dengan menyebutnya sebagai pengalihan subsidi dari sektor konsumtif ke sektor sektor produktif.  Tepat satu hari sebelumnya Tim Pemberantasan Mafia Migas dipimpin ekonom Faisal Basri telah terbentuk dan juga seminggu sebelumnya Jokowi dengan kabinet kerjanya telah tancap gas launching program Kartu Saktinya seakan mengirim sinyal akan segera menaikkan BBM setelah Jokowi kembali ke tanah air dari tiga konferensi internasional. Terang saja keputusan ini segera direspon pro kontra, demo anarkis yang meluas, mahasiswa, buruh dan Organda silih berganti membisingkan kondisi negeri dan semakin lengkap koalisi oposisi bertepuk tangan bak menangkap celah peluang dan amunisi untuk menggoyang pemerintahan. Salah satu argumen Mahasiswa dan Parlemen hampir sama bahwa Jokowi tidak punya alasan menaikkan harga BBM disaat harga minyak dunia turun. Jokowi dianggap memilih jalan pintas tanpa peduli kondisi rakyat. Hari hari ini nafsu oposisi klimaks ingin menginterpelasi Pemerintah.Tapi bukan Jokowi namanya kalau gentar atau bergeming tidak tenang,  Jokowi menjawab semua cacimaki dengan senyum dan hati yang dingin menusuk hati seakan akan menantang kebangkitan nafsu oposannya di Parlemen.

Benarkah Jokowi zalim dan telah menjadi pembunuh bagi rakyatnya yang telah memilihnya? Agak sulit membenarkan tuduhan subyektif ini bila tidak ada kesempatan waktu yang cukup diberikan kepada pemerintah untuk membuktikan keampuhan keputusannya ini.  Apa sebenarnya yang menjadi  sumber petaka ini sehingga Jokowi sangat yakin ingin membuka jalan baru mengubah mindset negara untuk segera move on dan merevolusi mental manja membakar bakar uang negara memboroskan sehingga APBN defisit. Salah satu faktor utama adalah soal klasik ketahanan energi. Ada cukup banyak pertanda kita mengalami fenomena resources curse. Banyak orang tidak tahubila Indonesia menjadi pengimpor bensin dan solar terbesar di dunia. Produksi minyak mentah rerata Januari-September 2014 tinggal 792 ribu barel sehari, mengalami penurunan secara persisten dari tingkat tertingginya sekitar 1,6 juta barel per hari pada 1981. Sebaliknya, konsumsi minyak meroket dari hanya 396 ribu barel sehari di 1980 menjadi lebih dari 1,6 juta barel di 2013 (Faisal Basri; Memaknai Tim Pemberantasan Mafia Migas, MetroTVnews.com)

Sudah 20 tahun Indonesia tidak membangun kilang baru. Kilang yang ada sudah uzur, bahkan masih ada yang merupakan peninggalan pemerintah kolonial. Akibatnya impor bahan bakar minyak (BBM) kian menggerogoti devisa negara. Di 2013 impor BBM mencapai USD28,6 miliar. Padahal pada 2001 baru USD2,6 miliar. Berarti hanya dalam waktu 12 tahun impor BBM naik sebelas kali lipat. Tekanan semakin berat karena sejak tahun 2013 Indonesia sudah mengalami defisit minyak mentah.

Ketahanan energi kita terkikis. Sepuluh tahun lalu kapasitas tangki penyimpanan BBM bisa untuk memenuhi kebutuhan 30 hari, sedangkan sekarang hanya 18 hari. Kita sama sekali tidak memiliki cadangan strategis. Kita memang tidak sekaya negara-negara Timur Tengah, Rusia, dan Amerika Serikat. Namun, di antara negara ASEAN, Indonesia terbilang paling kaya walaupun cadangan terbukti hanya sekitar 3,6 miliar barel. Dengan tingkat produksi sekarang, cadangan itu bakal habis dalam 13 tahun. Jika tidak ada eksplorasi, cadangan potensial sebanyak 3,7 miliar barel tidak akan menjelma sebagai cadangan terbukti (proven reserves).

Migas bukan sekadar sumber energi, melainkan juga sebagai pundi-pundi penerimaan negara atau penopang APBN. Ironisnya, subsidi BBM sudah jauh melampaui penerimaan negara dari bagi hasil minyak dan pajak keuntungan perusahaan minyak. Subsidi BBMlah yang membuat primary balance dalam APBN sudah mengalami defisit sejak 2012. Lebih ironis lagi, dalam sepuluh tahun terakhir, sembilan tahun terjadi subsidi BBM lebih besar dari defisit APBN. Secara tak langsung bisa dikatakan sebagian subsidi BBM sudah dibiayai dengan utang pemerintah.

Salah urus pengelolaan migas berimbas pula terhadap kemampuan industri. Karena tidak membangun kilang selama puluhan tahun, Indonesia kehilangan kesempatan menghasilkan produk ikutan dari BBM, yakni konsensat yang merupakan bahan baku utama industri petrokimia. Industri ini merupakan salah satu pilar utama industrialisasi. Tak heran kalau selama satu dasawarsa terakhir pertumbuhan industri manufaktur hampir selalu lebih rendah dari pertumbuhan PDB. Akibat lainnya, impor plastik dan barang dari plastik dan produk kimia organik relatif besar, masing-masing terbesar keempat dan kelima. Sudah saatnya kita menata ulang sektor migas. Kondisi yang kian memburuk berkelamaan terutama disebabkan oleh menyemutnya berbagai kelompok kepentingan (vested interest) yang melakukan praktisi pemburuan rente (rent seeking).

Hanya dengan penguatan institusi agar para elit tidak leluasa merampok kekayaan negara kita bisa mewujudkan cita-cita sebagaimana termaktub dalam Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Tugas sejarah kita mentransformasikan dari exclusive conomic and political institutions menjadi inclusive political and economic institutions. Semoga kekayaan alam kita menjadi berkah, bukan kutukan, bagi sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat. Itulah barangkali makna dari penugasan Tim Pemberantasan Mafia Migas. Kesempatan emas untuk menata sektor migas secara total. 

Lalu apa kaitannya problem alih subsidi ini dengan jualan Jokowi mengajak CEO-investor kakap dunia untuk datang ke Indonesia secara besar-besaran. Jokowi seakan ingin mengatakan sebentar lagi Pemerintah akan menyetop inefesiensi pemborosan pararel untuk menciptakan iklim investasi bagi kemajuan baru Indonesia. Apakah Jokowi ingin mengikuti jejak Tiongkok, Vietnam dan Myanmar yang maju pesat setelah jor-joran membuka kran investasi? Seperti yang kita ketahui, iklim investasi di Indonesia akhir-akhir ini nyata mengalami penurunan akibat gejolak politik yang terjadi di Indonesia. Indeks harga saham gabungan (IHSG) sempat mengalami penurunan seiring dengan kekhawatiran para investor bahwa pemerintahan Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla tidak akan mendapatkan dukungan dari parlemen karena dikuasainya DPR oleh Koalisi Merah Putih. Namun, secercah harapan muncul seiring dengan kebijakan Presiden terpilih Joko Widodo yang mengundang investor asing ke Indonesia. Hal ini diungkapkan Presiden Jokowi pada pidato perdananya di hadapan para CEO dunia pada forum KTT APEC yang berlangsung di Beijing pada 10 November 2014.

Di awal pidato, Presiden Jokowi memberikan gambaran tentang Indonesia yang memiliki 17.000 pulau dengan jumlah penduduk sekitar 240 juta jiwa, namun konektivitas antarpulau belum terbangun dengan baik sehingga ada kesenjangan harga komoditas barang antara pulau yang satu dengan yang lain. Ia mencontohkan harga semen di Papua 25 kali lipat dibandingkan dengan harga semen di Pulau Jawa. Oleh sebab itu, sektor yang dipromosikan adalah kemaritiman dengan membangun tol laut untuk menekan biaya transportasi.

Presiden Jokowi juga memaparkan sejumlah peluang yang ada di Indonesia. Ia menginginkan investasi yang besar dalam membangun transportasi logistik, membangun bandar udara dan memperluas 24 pelabuhan, transportasi masal kereta api, serta pembangkit tenaga listrik 35.000 MW. Pembangunan industrial zone di beberapa lokasi akan dilakukan agar industri di Indonesia berkembang.

Selain itu, Presiden Jokowi juga memaparkan bahwa kondisi pasar di Indonesia lebih kompetitif untuk membawa industri Indonesia ke arah perkembangan yang lebih baik. Khusus untuk raw material, Presiden Jokowi menjelaskan bahwa barang yang keluar dari Indonesia adalah barang setengah jadi dan barang jadi, hal ini dilakukan agar nilai tambah barang tersebut ada di Indonesia.

Selain memaparkan peluang yang ada, Presiden Jokowi mengungkapkan adanya sejumlah masalah yang menghambat pembangunan di Indonesia, misalnya masalah perizinan dan pembebasan lahan. Untuk mempermudah perizinan, semua kementerian yang berurusan dengan investasi akan berada dalam satu gedung dan membangun kantor perizinan. Sedangkan dalam upaya menyelesaikan pembebasan lahan, Presiden Jokowi akan melibatkan Menteri, Gubernur, dan Walikota untuk ikut serta membantu pembebasan lahan pada proyek-proyek yang sejalan dengan kebijakan Pemerintah dan sesuai dengan hukum yang berlaku.

Presiden Jokowi juga memaparkan pembenahan masalah impor di bidang perminyakan agar lifting produksi dapat segera naik sehingga impor dapat ditekan. Pengalihan subsidi BBM akan dialihkan kepada hal-hal yang produktif, antara lain benih dan pupuk untuk petani, irigasi untuk desa, pembangunan waduk, pembangunan infrastruktur, dan mesin untuk kapal untuk nelayan. Namun, Presiden Jokowi berusaha menyakinkan kalangan usaha di Asia Pasifik, persoalan-persoalan tersebut akan menjadi fokus pembenahan dari pemerintahannya. Mengakhiri pidatonya, Presiden Jokowi mengundang kalangan usaha di forum APEC untuk berinvestasi dalam pembangunan di Indonesia.

Pidato Presiden Jokowi tersebut banyak menuai pujian dan dinilai beberapa kalangan pebisnis internasional membawa harapan yang cerah dalam berinvestasi di Indonesia. Selain itu, Pidato Presiden Jokowi digambarkan secara sederhana, padat, kongkrit, dan realistis dalam mencapai kemakmuran Indonesia dan tentu saja kemudahan investasi bagi warga dunia. Tanggapan positif juga datang dari beberapa Kepala Negara/Pemerintahan, Presiden Vietnam, Perdana Menteri Jepang, Presiden Rusia, Presiden AS, dan Presiden Tiongkok.

Presiden Vietnam menganggap Indonesia sebagai sahabat dan akan berkomitmen untuk mendorong kerja sama kedua negara. Perdana Menteri Jepang menyebut  Indonesia sebagai mitra strategis Jepang, dan sebagai negara maritim, kedua pihak harus berkontribusi demi kedamaian dan keadilan. Melalui investasi Jepang ke Indonesia, Pemerintah Jepang ingin berkontribusi di bidang industri dan pembangunan sumber daya manusia melalui berbagai kerja sama di bidang industri kreatif dan pertukaran pelajar.

Sedangkan Presiden Rusia berkeyakinan hubungan kedua negara sebagai mitra strategis akan semakin baik pada masa yang akan datang. Presiden Tiongkok, Xi Jinping mengatakan kedua negara akan menjalin persahabatan yang sangat dalam dengan saling menghormati sebagai negara tetangga dan sahabat lama. Tanggapan serupa juga datang dari Presiden AS, Barack Obama, yang merasa senang bertemu dengan Presiden Jokowi dan berharap bisa memperkuat kerja sama.

Peningkatan daya saing global Indonesia yang terjadi di tengah masa transisi pemerintahan merupakan modal kuat bagi pemerintahan baru untuk menentukan arah perekonomian Indonesia ke depan. Berdasarkan laporan Forum Ekonomi Dunia (WEF) bertajuk Global Competitiveness Report 2014, daya saing ekonomi Indonesia berada di peringkat 34 dari 144 negara, naik empat tingkat dari posisi sebelumnya di level 38. Dengan demikian, dalam upaya peningkatan daya saing global Indonesia diperlukan jaminan kepastian hukum bagi para investor.

Kepastian hukum merupakan kunci penting yang harus diperhatikan Pemerintah untuk menciptakan iklim investasi yang baik, misalnya dalam hal ketentuan perundang-undangan masih terdapat sejumlah peraturan perundang-undangan yang jauh dari kepastian hukum, saling tumpang tindih sehingga membebani investor. Adanya jaminan kepastian hukum di Indonesia bagi para investor akan berdampak meningkatnya nilai investasi di dalam negeri. Di samping itu, perlu adanya jaminan proses penegakan hukum yang dilakukan tanpa pandang bulu. Kualitas dan penegakan hukum adalah faktor dominan dan saling mempengaruhi. Sebaliknya, lemahnya penegakan hukum dan kepastian hukum mempengaruhi minimnya kepercayaan publik, dan berujung pada iklim investasi dan penurunan penerimaan negara.

Melalui pidato tersebut, mungkin Jokowi ingin menyiratkan banyak dampak positif yang akan dirasakan bagi Indonesia, antara lain peningkatan hubungan bilateral, baik tingkat regional maupun internasional, khususnya pengembangan kerja sama di bidang-bidang yang menjadi prioritas Kabinet Kerja. Di antaranya adalah pembangunan infrastruktur serta peningkatan ekonomi, perdagangan, dan investasi, termasuk di bidang maritim, yang akan memberikan manfaat langsung kepada peningkatan kesejahteraan rakyat Indonesia. Hal-hal yang disampaikan Presiden Jokowi di pertemuan APEC ini sejalan dengan kepentingan nasional dan diharapkan dapat meningkatkan perkembangan ekonomi Indonesia ke arah yang lebih baik. Semoga.

Obituari, Matinya Politik Akal Sehat

Kapan persisnya Malaikat El-Maut (Angel of Death) menjemput kematian politik akal sehat, hal itu tidak diketahui persis. Namun, ia tidak berumur panjang, mati dalam usia yang sangat muda. Dilahirkan pada akhir tahun 1990-an sebagai buah dari rajutan cinta dan kerinduan terhadap tatanan kekuasaan yang menghargai serta memuliakan martabat manusia: keadilan, kesetaraan, toleransi, pengakuan, dan penghargaan terhadap heterogenitas serta nilai-nilai luhur lainnya. Romantisisme cinta publik terhadap manajemen kekuasaan negara di awal reformasi mungkin mirip sensasi dan fantasi romantisisme rakyat Athena terhadap demokrasi, ratusan abad sebelum Masehi dalam buku Victoria Wohl, Love Among The Ruins (2002), mengenai erotisme demokrasi di Athena klasik.
Kehadiran politik akal sehat juga menghasilkan energi dahsyat yang mampu meluluhlantakkan tatanan kekuasaan yang represif dan otoritarian. Namun, daya tahan tubuhnya merosot secara drastis sejalan dengan semakin menumpuknya racun opium kekuasaan yang bersarang di tubuhnya. Toksin yang memproduksi penyakit kanker ganas yang disebut korupsi politik sudah menjalar ke seluruh sendi dan tulang sumsum hampir di sekujur tubuh politik negara. Daya bunuh racun ganas itu juga mematikan nurani dan integritas, menghancurkan kredibilitas, melumpuhkan kompetensi, dan meluluhlantakkan nilai-nilai yang menjadi pilar politik akal sehat.
Sementara itu, praktik politik akal-akalan dan perilaku munafik yang menghamba uang semakin subur. Akibatnya, demokrasi disulap menjadi mobokrasi, seremoni mengalahkan substansi, citra menghapus fakta, sikap santun bersenyawa dengan perilaku durhaka, kejujuran identik dengan kebodohan. Medan politik menjadi ladang pembantaian oleh para petualang politik yang bermodal besar terhadap politisi bersih dan idealis tetapi bermodal cupet.
Kutipan di atas, yang diangkat dalam tajuk harian Kompas, mengonfirmasi kematian politik akal sehat. Angka yang disebut tidak terlalu berbeda dengan jumlah yang beredar di kalangan politisi bahwa ongkos menjadi anggota DPR minimal Rp 5 miliar. Jumlah yang fantastis dan membikin merinding bulu kuduk rakyat yang terengah-engah berjuang memenuhi kehidupan minimal sehari-hari.
Hal itu membuktikan hasrat politisi yang didominasi dan tunduk kepada kepentingan ekonomi bersedia mengeluarkan biaya yang sangat tinggi demi kekuasaan, meskipun mereka tahu total pendapatan selama lima tahun jauh lebih kecil daripada ongkos yang dikeluarkan.
Perilaku sama dan sebangun sudah akan terjadi pada 2013, karena pada tahun ini diperkirakan akan diselenggarakan 160 pilkada, termasuk pilkada yang seharusnya dilakukan pada 2014. Karena itu, pilkada tahun ini diperkirakan tidak akan banyak manfaatnya bagi masyarakat. Terlebih, selain masih didominasi politik uang, regulasi pilkada, termasuk RUU yang sedang dibahas, belum dapat menjamin lahirnya kepala daerah yang mempunyai komitmen mempergunakan kekuasaan untuk kepentingan rakyat.
Kualitas yang berkaitan dengan integritas dan kompetensi tidak cukup hanya diobati dengan rekayasa elektoral melalui perubahan dari pilkada secara langsung diubah melalui DPRD. Persoalannya jauh lebih mendasar, partai politik harus melakukan pendidikan karakter bagi kader-kadernya yang dipersiapkan untuk menduduki jabatan tersebut.
Hal yang hampir dapat dipastikan akan terjadi pula pada pemilu legislatif dan pemilihan presiden yang secara maraton akan diselenggarakan pada 2014. Medan politik akan benar-benar menjadi pasar modal. Pemilik modal akan menjadi ”tuan besar” dan pemenang yang sesungguhnya karena merekalah yang akan banyak menentukan kalah-menang dalam pertarungan politik tahun depan. Bahkan dikhawatirkan petualang politik juga akan berusaha menggerogoti Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara serta memanfaatkan akses politik mereka untuk menguras kekayaan negara.
Akibatnya, kematian politik akal sehat sangat menghancurkan sendi-sendi kehidupan bangsa dan negara. Sayang, tidak banyak orang yang tahu sehingga yang meratapi dan berduka juga tidak banyak. Namun, yang masih memberikan harapan adalah pengalaman empiris yang menjadi dalil politik bahwa orang sekali mati akan mati selamanya. Namun, perjuangan politik dapat mati berkali-kali dan akan hidup kembali. Karena itu, orang-orang yang berniat baik tidak boleh berdiam diri. Dalam kehidupan yang sarat dengan segala macam penyakit masyarakat, bersenyap-senyap sendiri dan tidak peduli adalah kejahatan sosial.
Spirit dan roh yang menebarkan kemuliaan masih banyak dan tersebar di berbagai kalangan, cendekiawan, kelompok profesional, bahkan di kalangan politisi dan birokrat serta berbagai organisasi masyarakat. Mereka yang gigih dan tak pernah lelah melakukan perlawanan terhadap kebatilan. Kekuatan magis inilah yang akan menghidupkan kembali politik yang bernalar dan mulia. Agenda yang sangat penting adalah mengawasi perekrutan politik serta mempersiapkan gagasan besar untuk menata kekuasaan yang lebih beradab pasca-Pemilu 2014.
J KRISTIADI Peneliti Senior di CSIS
 

The Navy and The Nation : The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia

In putting together The Navy and the Nation David Stevens and John Reeve have assembled something far more valuable than a mere narrative history of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). In many regards it is an historical argument against taking something of great value for granted. At a time when navies the world over are having their funding cut and their worth questioned, the editors of this volume have cobbled together a significant statement of the enduring value of the RAN to the nation it serves. The book, a collection of essays drawn from the biennial King-Hall Naval History Conference, provides a plethora of examples detailing the immense contributions of the RAN to Australia . While there is no escaping the fact that this is a compilation of conference papers, and not a coherent narrative, it should not be dismissed as the intellectual equivalent of being made to eat leftovers. This is history written, compiled, and edited with a purpose. As a collection of arguments begging the consideration of a host of events, personalities, and contributions made either in connection with or on behalf of the RAN, The Navy and the Nation provides forceful testimony to the importance of this navy to its island nation. Rather than a single author advancing a thesis, Stevens and Reeve provide the theses of several writers that serve the greater purpose of demonstrating how the RAN has benefited Australia . Divided into four parts, the book has a sensible organization that carries readers from “concepts and contexts,” a Mahanian macro-view of Australia ’s place in an evolving naval epic, through sections entitled “the Navy and the nation,” “ships, industry and technology for Australia ,” and “naval people and the nation.” Among the 19 essays contained in these sections are those touching upon everything from hydrographic surveys, the RAN’s place in furthering the foreign policy aims of Australia ’s political leaders, the most famous ships to have served the nation, the historic importance of ship building in Australia , and the value of naval experience in the Australian populace. The most compelling of these essays extol the traditional strengths of navies while managing to place those strengths in particularly Australian contexts. The editors draw on a wide range of talents and the essays are representative of a vast expanse of knowledge. In some regards this compilation’s greatest strength, a wonderfully diverse testament to the value of navies, the RAN specifically, is also its greatest weakness. Lacking the coherence of a single storyline, this collection might seem to some readers as being a bit too all encompassing. However well the editors may have chosen individual essays to suit their purpose, the fact remains that this is a compilation that lacks natural transitions and it requires close attention if large sections are to be digested at a single reading. For instance, Neil Westphalen’s interesting account of the naval and medical services nexus is, in a strict sense, the only essay of its kind in the book. Similarly, Geoff Cannon’s contribution “Technology transfer, knowledge partnerships and the advance of Australian naval combat systems,” is more contemporary and in some regards more specialized than most of the other offerings. That quibble aside, the book’s essays make several cogent arguments that do great credit to the editors and the RAN. As unorthodox as this book might appear at first glance, it should be noted that it does contain impressive examples of what might best be called traditional naval history. The contributions of Geoffrey Till and David Stevens are perhaps the best offerings of this genre to be found in this collection. Till does an admirable job of setting a strategic backdrop upon which other developments/essays can best be viewed and Stevens offers a compelling, if not touching account of one of the most famous ships in the nation’s history. In many ways Stevens’ account of the life and death of HMAS Australia is reflective of the book’s aim to place the navy at the fore of the nation’s quest for identity. In general, it would be difficult not to be impressed with all that the RAN has contributed to Australia ’s rise as a nation, based upon the contents of this book. Whether one is interested in the history of navies in general, or of Australia’s navy alone, The Navy and the Nation contains a wealth of useful scholarship and is worthy of a place in the library of any student of naval history. David Stevens and John Reeve (eds.), The Navy and the Nation: The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia, Allen & Unwin, 2005. 438 pp., illustrations, pictures, endnotes, and index. Review by Charles Steele Department of History, United States Air Force Academy

Somalia: Lesson From the Past

1. Introduction

In the early 1990s, organisations such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) began to register reports of (attempted) piracy. As will become clear in this essay, the timing was not accidental. Piracy, as we know, is a contemporary phenomenon with a long history. That means that there are lessons to be drawn from the past.[1] It appears that the phenomenon of piracy has three aspects that have kept recurring throughout the centuries, and can also be discerned in the current events in the waters around Somalia , namely: piracy is primarily experienced and condemned by its victims; piracy is a phenomenon occurring at the periphery; people resort to piracy for an underlying reason. These three aspects of piracy will be examined in this short article. They will be illustrated by historical examples, after which we will focus on the situation in Somalia . 2. The Victims Piracy has been occurring since antiquity. Classical scholar Philip de Souza aptly articulated the notion that the term “piracy” stems mainly from the vocabulary of the victims. Piracy is a term normally applied in a pejorative manner. Pirates can be defined as armed robbers whose activities normally involve the use of ships. They are men who have been designated as such by other people, regardless of whether or not they consider themselves to be pirates.[2] Thus the term ‘piracy’ has a negative connotation, usually conveying a sense of moral judgement. Pirates are people who have been labelled as such by others, irrespective of whether they see themselves as pirates. The term “piracy” is therefore mainly used and qualified by its victims. A consequence of this is that those aggrieved by piracy are often ill-informed about its background. I will illustrate this with a number of examples from the recent past. From 1994, a dramatic increase was seen in the incidence of attempted piracy in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea . The number of reports rose from approximately 50 per year to almost 500 in the year 2000. It was not until 2005, however, before serious studies into illegal activities of this kind were published, including, D. Johnson and M. Valencia (eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses (Leiden/Singapore: IIAS, 2005), and A.J. Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia : History, Causes and Remedies (Leiden/Singapore: IIAS, 2007). Since then, the number of reports of piracy in the region has fallen to the approximate level of the mid-1990s and the focus of attention has, to some extent, shifted away from the region.[3] In March 2009, the RAND Corporation convened a small group of experts from the U.S. government, allied partner nations, the maritime industry, and academic organisations to reconsider the underlying factors that drive maritime piracy in the 21st century. Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from the workshop is that mitigating the complex nature of maritime crime requires the input of all relevant stakeholders – state, national, private, and non-governmental – and must necessarily embrace measures that go well beyond the simple and expedient reactive deployment of naval assets. However, no representatives from the region (Horn of Africa) had been invited.[4] This was also the case at the seminar of 8 July 2009 organised by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael under the title “Pioneering for Solutions Against Piracy: Focusing on a Geopolitical Analysis, Counter-Piracy Initiatives and Policy Solutions”. The seminar was concerned mainly with the Indian Ocean and Somalia : Participants in this seminar are academics, policy makers, and top-level military staff, from EU member states and institutions, NATO, and American universities, who all have a professional interest in the subject.[5] Apparently, it was thought that solutions for the problem of piracy could be found without the advice of representatives from the region. Just recently, UN special representative for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah said: “Piracy on the high seas cannot be fought by international naval fleets alone, but requires a regional approach that also deals with its root causes.” In my opinion not only an open door, but a little bit late as well.[6] 3. Piracy as a phenomenon at the periphery A study into the history of piracy reveals that piracy is a phenomenon which chiefly occurs at the periphery. In Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, Anne Pérotin-Dumon put it as follows: There is a description of piracy that spans the ages: illegal and armed aggression at points of maritime traffic that are important but under weak political control. The aggression is committed by the marginal who seek to appropriate the wealth of the more affluent, or by newcomers desiring to force their way into pre-existing trade routes.[7] The essence of this quotation lies, of course, in: “at points of maritime traffic that are important but under weak political control.” Piracy thus occurs in areas where (relatively) little political power is being exercised or can be exercised. Such areas are often located at the periphery, far removed from the centre of power. This demands some explanation. The process of state formation The period roughly between 1500 and 1800 is known as the Early Modern Period. This period is characterised by the rise of the “military fiscal state.” By the end of the Middle Ages, the emerging monetary economy had created the conditions enabling rulers to hire professional soldiers. Not only did this professionalization of warfare result in more conflicts, it also made them much more costly. Stronger governments were needed to generate higher revenue through taxation in order to finance increasingly expensive wars. In turn, the more powerful a state became, the more inclined it would be to wage wars. What emerged was a self-reinforcing spiral of wars, taxation and state formation.[8] During the Modern Period, roughly the period from 1800 to 1990, this development in the Western World led to the formation of nation-states, combining a powerful state with a population who considered themselves to be part of that state. Nationalism provided a sense of shared identity. Money was no longer required for building up an army and a fleet. Enormous conscript armies, raised on the basis of nationalism and a national identity, were now fighting each other. Since then, we have entered into the Post-modern Period, characterised by the diminishing influence of the state. This has brought about two developments in many armed forces. First of all, there was the transformation from conscript to all-professional armed forces in the mid-1990s. In that regard, we have returned to the situation of the Early Modern Period.[9] As for other parts of the world: not only have states become weaker, a few, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia , have even disappeared. Somalia has also effectively ceased to exist as a nation-state. In other words: the Somalian government, assuming there is such a thing, exercises very little political power. The fight against piracy Here is not the place to give a detailed description of piracy and what was and is being done to combat it. I will therefore limit myself to the four most significant periods that can be distinguished in the history of countering piracy since Early Modern times. The first period runs from the end of the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century. The increasingly powerful maritime states of Western Europe succeeded in suppressing piracy in the North and Baltic Seas . By 1650, merchant ships in Western European waters hardly needed protection any longer.[10] During the second period, the fight against piracy shifted to the Mediterranean . The activities of the Barbary corsairs, who operated from the Ottoman regencies of Tripoli , Algiers and Tunis and from independent Morocco , were viewed by Western powers as ordinary acts of piracy. It was not until the early nineteenth century, when particularly Spain and France brought their influence to bear in North Africa, that the Barbary corsairs disappeared from the scene for good.[11] The third period was the so-called war against piracy, which took place approximately from 1715 to 1730 when the Royal Navy waged a merciless campaign to suppress piracy in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean . Hundreds of pirates were hanged during this campaign.[12] The fourth and last period was during the nineteenth century when the Dutch and British colonial administrations dealt with the last pirates’ nests in Southeast Asia .[13] By around 1900, piracy had been eradicated. In 1925, the Harvard Law Review rhetorically asked: “Is the crime of Piracy Obsolete?” The answer given was affirmative. Piracy was mostly considered an interesting phenomenon from the past.[14] From a Western European perspective, the fight against piracy has seen a steady shift away from the centre. Whenever the Western European powers wished to exercise political control in the periphery of their spheres of influence, they were faced with combating piracy. By the time the Western colonial powers controlled about eighty percent of the world, the days of piracy were finished. The absence of piracy is thus a phenomenon of the modern era. During the 1980s, however, a major transition took place as the clear-cut bipolar world of the Cold War, with its two great power blocs whose influence extended throughout vast parts of the globe, transformed into a multi-polar world with a great deal more political instability, particularly at the periphery. It should therefore come as no surprise that in 1991 the IMB and IMO began to keep a register of reported attacks on seagoing vessels. As the Modern Period came to a close, piracy had once again reared its head (table 1). Table 1. Reported cases of piracy, 1991-2009 1991 107 1998 200 2000 471 2003 445 2004 329 2005 276 2006 239 2007 263 2008 293 2009 (first six months) 240 Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Reports Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, available on ICC webpage, URL: www.icc-ccs.org. Somalia On a local scale, this mechanism of political stability, or rather instability, can also be observed in Somalia . Piracy in Somalian waters started occurring about ten years ago. With the advent of the so-called Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in south Somalia in 2006 came the expectation that this new government would be able to curb piracy. But following the ousting of the ICU by, among others, Ethiopian troops, the last vestige of government disappeared and the incidence of piracy increased explosively (table 2).[15] Table 2. Piracy incidents near Somalia , 2003-2009 2003 18 2004 8 2005 10 2006 10 2007 13 2008 92 2009 (first six months) 130 Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Reports Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, available on ICC webpage, URL: www.icc-ccs.org. The lack of political control has historically been a essential precondition for piracy, but it is in itself not sufficient to explain the phenomenon. After all, there are other regions that are under very weak political control and yet have not seen the development of piracy. Examples are countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone .[16] 4. Causes History has shown that there is usually a reason or cause, explaining why people in regions with relatively little political control resort to piracy. I will offer two illustrative examples. The Dutch Sea Beggars Around 1560, there was something brewing in the Netherlands . There was widespread discontent about the centralist policies of the Habsburgs in Brussels , which violated the age-old privileges and customs of regional administrations. The long drawn-out wars waged by the rulers in Brussels against France were causing major harm to economic interests. At the same time, the new religious insights of Martin Luther and John Calvin found fertile soil in the Low Countries, a development towards which the government in Brussels was less than understanding. Tensions erupted in the autumn of 1566 with the outbreak of the Iconoclastic Fury, which drove King Philip II to dispatch his commander Don Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alva, to the Low Countries to restore order. This led a number of protestant exiles to revolt. Their supreme goal was to repel Alva and “restore” Protestantism, and they saw William of Orange as their leader. In addition to hijacking ships, they specialised in capturing dignitaries in order to collect a ransom, a practice known as “rationing” (rantsoenering). In the eyes of the Habsburg rulers, the Sea Beggars were nothing but ordinary pirates. The pirate activities of the Sea Beggars were thus ignited by the Netherlands ’ struggle for independence from Habsburg rule.[17] Pirates of the Caribbean The adventures of captain Jack Sparrow in the Pirates of the Caribbean movies by Walt Disney are inspired by the so-called golden age of piracy. Roughly between 1716 and 1726, approximately 1,500 to 2,500 pirates were operating from a total of twenty to thirty heavily armed ships in the West-Indies and the Atlantic Ocean . Marxist-oriented maritime historian Marcus Rediker believes that these sea-robbers formed a multicultural, democratic and egalitarian community and were the product of gross social injustice. In his view, they were the forerunners of the American and French revolutionaries. Here, the underlying cause of piracy was social inequality and the class struggle.[18] Somalia Diminishing fish stocks, caused by illegal fishing and illegal dumping of waste by Western companies, are generally assumed to be the reason why Somalian fishermen have resorted to piracy. In a BBC interview, the twenty-five year old Somali Dahir Mohamed Hayeysi declared: I used to be a fisherman with a poor family that depended only on fishing. The first day joining the pirates came into my mind was in 2006. A group of our villagers, mainly fishermen I knew, were arming themselves. One of them told me that they wanted to hijack ships, which he said were looting our sea resources. He told me it was a national service with a lot of money in the end. Then I took my gun and joined them. Years ago we used to fish a lot, enough for us to eat and sell in the markets. Then illegal fishing and dumping of toxic wastes by foreign fishing vessels affected our livelihood, depleting the fish stocks. I had no other choice but to join my colleagues. The first hijack I attended was in February 2007 when we seized a World Food Programme-chartered ship with 12 crew. I think it had the name of MV Rozen and we released it after two months, with a ransom. Now I have two lorries, a luxury car and have started my own business in town. The interview ends with the following statement: The only way the piracy can stop is if [ Somalia ] gets an effective government that can defend our fish. And then we will disarm, give our boats to that government and will be ready to work. Foreign navies can do nothing to stop piracy.[19] 5. Conclusion The conclusion should be clear: piracy will continue to exist as long as there are politically unstable regions located along important sea routes. As piracy is chiefly a result of political instability, it must be combated first of all on land.[20] This is both good and bad news for the navies currently operating near the Horn of Africa. The bad news is that the deployment of navy ships and the escorting of merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean will not bring about a decrease in piracy. With those efforts we are merely fighting the symptoms. As the Netherlands ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation informed the Dutch Parliament on March 13, 2009: Operation Allied Protector is a brief military contribution intended to combat the symptoms of piracy near the Horn of Africa while, in an international context, the transition process in Somalia and the implementation of the Djibouti agreement are being supported and a study is being conducted, through, among others, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, into how regional capacity building can contribute to countering piracy in the long term.[21] The good news is that the deployment of navy ships against Somalian pirates will continue for an indefinite period into the future. For now, the hope for peace in the region has faded and the Djibouti agreement has been consigned to the wastepaper basket. Strict Islamic groups appear to be gaining the upper hand. As has been shown by the Islamic Courts Union, such organisations will bring a certain degree of political stability, enabling the suppression of piracy. On the other hand, regimes of this kind are unacceptable to the West. The United States has recently sent 40 tonnes of weapons to Somalia . Direct intervention is, after all, an undesirable option, evidence of which is provided by 1993 US operation in Mogadishu (depicted in the movie Black Hawk Down). In my opinion, in Somalia the international community finds itself caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.[22] [1] D.J. Puchala, “Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach”, Contempory Security Policy 26 (April 2005) 1:1-24. [2] Ph. De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1. [3] “Southeast Asia Maritime Security Review, 3rd Quarter 2008” , available on the webpage of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, URL: www.rsis.edu.sg; IIAS Newsletter 36 (March, 2005); P. Gwin, “Dark Passage: The Straits of Malakka. Pirates Haunt it. Sailors Fear it. Global Trade Depends on it”, National Geographic (October, 2007) 126-149. [4] Peter Chalk, Laurence Smallman and Nicholas Burger, Countering Piracy in the Modern Era. Notes from a RAND Workshop to Discuss the Best Approaches for Dealing with Piracy in the 21st Century ( Washington : RAND Corporation, 2009). [5] “Discussion Paper Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme “Pioneering for Solutions Against Piracy” Focusing on a Geopolitical Analysis, Counter-piracy Initiatives and Policy Solutions”, available on the webpage of Clingendael, URL: www.Clingendael.nl. [6] AFP, “UN calls for multi-level approach in fighting piracy” (November 18, 2009), available on the webpage of Google: http://www.google.com. [7] A. Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450- 1850” , in C.R. Pennell (ed.), Bandits of the Sea: A Pirates Reader ( New York : New York University Press, 2001) 25. [8] Ch. Tilly, Coercian, Capital, and European States , AD 990-1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); R. Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995); P. Wilson, “European Warfare, 1450- 1815” , in J. Black (ed.), War in the Early Modern World, 1450-1815 (London: UCL Press, 1999) 177-206. [9] Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven. Een kwestie van verantwoordelijkheden (The Hague, 2007); J.M.D van Leeuwe, “De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven in operatiegebieden”, Militaire Spectator 177 (2008) 4:240-245. [10] V.W. Lunsford, Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands ( New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); J.C. Appleby, “A Nursery of Pirates: the English Pirate Community in Ireland in the Early 17th Century”, International Journal of Maritime History 2 (1990) 1:1-27; C. Senior, A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in its Heyday (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1976). [11] J. de Courcy Ireland, “Raïs Hamidou: The last of the Great Algerian Corsairs”, The Mariner’s Mirror 60 (1974) 2:187-196; D.J. Vitkus and N. Matar, Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001); D. Panzac, Barbary Corsairs: the End of a Legend, 1800-1820 (Leiden: Brill, 2005); N. Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005). [12] D. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and Reality of Life among the Pirates (New York: Harvast Book, 1995); Aaron Smith, The Atrocities of the Pirates (Guilford:The Lyons Press, 1999); J. Rogoziński, Honor among Thieves: Captain Kidd, Henry Every, and the Pirate Democracy in the Indian Ocean (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000); P. Earl, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2003). [13] J.N.F.M. à Campo, “Asymmetry, Disparity and Cyclicity: Charting the Piracy Conflict in Colonial Indonesia”, International Journal of Maritime History 19 (2007) 1:35-62; G. Teitler, A.M.C. van Dissel and J.N.F.M. à Campo, Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in de Indische archipel, 19de eeuw (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005). [14] E.D. Dickinson, “Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete”, Harvard Law Review 37 (1924/5) 334-36. [15] R. Middleton, Piracy in Somalia Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars (October, 2008), available on the webpage of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, URL: www.chathamhouse.org.uk. [16] D. Nincic, “State Failure and the Re-Emergence of Maritime Piracy”, available on the webpage of All Academic Research, URL: http://www.allacademic.com. [17] J.C.A. de Meij, De Watergeuzen en de Nederlanden, 1568-1572 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1972). [18] M. Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea : Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); M. Rediker, Villains of the Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age ( London : Verso, 2004). [19] “It’s a Pirate’s Life for Me”, available on the webpage of the BBC, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8010061.stm. [20] M. Schenkel, “Los zeeroverij op aan land. Effectief gezag in Somalië is vereiste voor uitbannen van piraterij”, NRC-Handelsblad (November 22, 2008). [21] Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingsamenwerking aan Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (29 521, nr. 93) (March 13, 2009). [22] K. Lindijer, “Hoop op vrede in Somalië is alweer vervlogen. Nieuwe gevechtsronde onafwendbaar door verdeeldheid, buitenlandse inmenging en criminele belangen”, NRC-Handelsblad (May 22, 2009); M.B. Sheridan, “U.S. has sent 40 Ton of Munition to Aid Somali Governemnt”, The Washington Post (June 27, 2009); K. Lindijer, “Al-Shabaab trekt strijders van overal aan”, NRC-Handelsbla (August 6, 2009).

In Search of Captain Cook: Exploring the Man Through His Own Words

It is reasonable to assume that everything that could possibly be written on the life and achievements of Captain James Cook has been written. However, in this brief, thematic look at this enigmatic British explorer, Dan O’Sullivan advances an interesting perspective. He makes no effort to overturn the definitive work on Cook – J.C. Beaglehole’s The Life of Captain James Cook – and he happily avoids either of the two partisan extremes usually associated with the subject of 18th and 19th century exploration: hagiographic treatments or the all-explorers-are-racist-imperialists school. Sullivan wisely skirts the more recent, largely esoteric debate between Gananath Obeyesekere and Marshall Sahlin as to whether Hawaiian islanders reaction to Cook indicated a “Western” rationality.

Instead, In Search of Captain Cook returns to what are practically the only surviving records – the logs from Cook’s three voyages – and tries to present an accurate portrait of the explorer’s personality by measuring it against several situational templates: how Cook interacted with the officers and men of his ships, Cook’s contribution to science and health, and his understanding and treatment of the native peoples he encountered. The process of unraveling the “real” James Cook is complicated. Aside from the logs, a handful of surviving letters, and the recorded impressions of but a few officers and men, there are scant primary sources. The traditional picture of Cook is of an almost stereotypical hero: brave, resolute, determined, and far-sighted. Even Cook’s murder in Hawaii in 1779 has an appropriately iconic feel to it. Any sense of humor or more prosaic personal trait is simply missing from the image we have. But, as O’Sullivan points out, even the best surviving sources can be misleading. When Cook returned in 1771 from his first voyage on HM Bark Endeavor, both the Royal Navy and government were quick to appreciate the domestic public relations benefit of Cook’s words and deeds. They considered, however, that Cook’s diction needed polishing, and so the more fluent writer John Hawkesworth was hired to shepherd the book to press. Not only did Hawkesworth reword some of Cook’s more stoic and technical diary entries, but he used the works of other voyage participants (principally botanist Joseph Banks) to augment Cook, merging them all into what appeared to be a seamless whole, and presenting the completed package as the unvarnished thoughts and actions of Britain’s newest hero. The fact is that James Cook was a self-taught naval officer, not a professional writer. He recorded his log entries in such a way as to keep an accurate record of information intended to assist other ships’ captains. Talk of tides, winds, and locations in minutes, degrees, and seconds might be essential for another seaman, but were judged to be excess for the well-read target audience. Cook was displeased with the artificial result, and during the course of his next voyage (1774-1776), he kept the public end-goal in mind. Accordingly he went through several drafts of his own log entries, gradually improving as a less-technical writer. To get even close to the truth of James Cook, then, it is necessary to plumb his original words and thoughts, not those later adapted by others for public consumption. O’Sullivan’s statement that “Since Cook’s death there have been many Cooks,” refers to the praise or damnation heaped upon James Cook by authors living in different eras, with different axes to grind. It is an accurate assessment. Stripping away the myth – some of it started even in Cook’s lifetime – is a challenging business.

The author’s James Cook comes across as a human being, not a statue. He has likes and dislikes (he refers to the Malekulans of the New Hebrides, for instance, as “the most ugly and ill proportioned people I ever saw”), opinions – some of them prescient, some erroneous; he has a sense of obligation to his crew and the people he encounters; he operates from a singular sense of duty and purpose. While not afraid to flog offending sailors, he nevertheless provides intelligent leadership in places that could not be more remote or different from the Yorkshire village where he was born. Cook was in almost every sense a scientist, although even that word was unknown to his era. He understood the importance of diet on crew health but never made the critical link to citrus fruit (he advocated fresh meat and vegetables); he displayed a delicate understanding of diverse cultures, and the possible negative impact of Western society on those cultures weighed heavily on him despite his duty to make first contact. Cook makes errors, too, but generally ones that are understandable when viewed through an 18th century lens – and even his final error on Hawaii fits into this paradigm. The debate over the nature and significance of James Cook and his voyages will certainly continue. In Search of Captain Cook is a welcome addition to that search for meaning. Dan O’Sullivan, In Search of Captain Cook: Exploring the Man Through His Own Words, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2008. 233 pp., illustrations, references, suggested reading, index. Review by Mark M. Hull Department of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Operation Thunderhead: The True Story of Vietnam’s Final POW Rescue—And the Last Navy SEAL Killed in Country

The story of the American prisoners of war (POW) in Vietnam has been told many times with the definitive account being Stuart Rochester and Frederick Kiley’s Honor Bound: The History of American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973 (Naval Institute Press, 1998). This “new” POW book by Kevin Dockery re-hashes the story of John Dramesi’s ill-fated May 1969 escape attempt and ends with a coda about an aborted June 1972 U.S. Navy special operations mission to assist Dramesi in a second attempt that never happened. Air Force Captain John Dramesi was a brash young officer from South Philadelphia who in May of 1969 made a daring escape attempt from the “Zoo Annex” prison in Hanoi with fellow Air Force Captain Ed Atterberry. The two men planned to break out of the camp disguised as Vietnamese peasants, steal a sampan, and paddle down the Red River to the Gulf of Tonkin , where they hoped to be picked up by the U.S. Navy. Escaping from the prison proved to be the easiest part of the mission, but the two men never fully considered how they would be able to travel over 110 miles through hostile, heavily populated territory to the coast. The fact that neither man was of Asian heritage or spoke Vietnamese compounded their difficulties. The escape attempt occurred without the blessings of compound’s senior ranking POW, Air Force Captain Konrad Trautman. Trautman felt he could not order Dramesi and Atterbery to cancel the attempt because the Code of Conduct specifically demanded that POWs make every effort to escape, but he did believe that the attempt was ill-advised and could cause severe repercussions for other POWs held at the Zoo Annex. The two men escaped from the compound at night by crawling through an attic above the cells and clamoring down the roof of the facility to the street. A North Vietnamese patrol discovered the two men at sunup the next day in a bramble thicket about four miles from the Zoo Annex. Over the course of the next two months, the prison authorities severely tortured the two escapees plus two dozen other American POWs. One officer, Lieutenant Eugene “Red” McDaniel, received 700 lashes as well as electric shocks and a form of rope torture during the ordeal, which he called his “darkest hour.” After seven days of severe torture, Atterbery died—a death Dockery attributes to pneumonia, but which Rochester and Kiley argue had to have been caused by excessive torture and medical neglect. Dockery, a “radio broadcaster, gunsmith, and historian” and the author of a number of popular histories of the SEALs, staunchly defends Dramesi throughout the book as an American hero. But other historians of the POW experience view his actions in a more critical light. Rochester and Kiley define him as an “accident waiting to happen,” whose actions caused unnecessary pain and suffering for their fellow POWs. Operation Thunderhead also yields no new information on Dramesi or his escape, and because no sources are cited in the book, I am left wondering if Dockery even interviewed Dramesis or simply constructed his narrative from Dramesi’s memoir Code of Honor (Norton, 1975). There are also some embarrassing errors in the book, such as the misspelling Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Robinson Risner’s last name, “Reisner,” in several places in the book. A Korean War ace, Risner was one of the longest serving senior officers in the Hanoi Hilton, and the recipient of the Air Force Cross. Any historian of the American POW experience should have been able to spell his name properly. But what irritates this reviewer the most about Operation Thunderhead is the book’s misleading title. Only the last 62 pages of the book focus on the SEAL effort to assist Dramesi in a second escape bid in the spring of 1972. This portion of the book focuses solely on the SEAL operation to penetrate North Vietnamese territory, using the special operations submarine Grayback (LPSS 574). According to Dockery, the SEAL mission was plagued by problems from the very onset. During an attempt to land on an island in the Red River , a SEAL Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) ran out of battery power while fighting the strong currents of the river, forcing the 4-man SEAL and Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) crew to abort the mission, and destroy the SDV. After being rescued by helicopter and transported to Long Beach (CGN 9), the four operators attempted to return to Grayback by dropping from a helicopter and diving to the boat, but in the insertion attempt, one of the SEALs, Lieutenant Spence Dry, hit the water too hard and died, and several of the others were badly injured. A rescue helicopter eventually retrieved Dry’s corpse along with the three survivors. Communications difficulties had prevented Dry from informing Grayback of their attempted return to the boat, and so the boat launched a second SDV before their jump. This SDV, however, sunk almost immediately after launch, forcing the operators to scramble out of the vehicle and swim to the surface, where they were eventually rescued by a helicopter. The SEALs planned to make a third attempt with an inflatable boat, but this attempt was ultimately cancelled after the Grayback’s commanding officer suddenly shifted his boat’s location upon hearing chains being dragged near his boat. Dockery does not reveal his sources for this section of the book either, but presumably, he gleaned his details from interviews with some of the surviving special operations personnel. No official documents or after action reports are cited. The author also does not discuss Operation Mole—Dramesi’s second escape plan in which he and several others were to tunnel out of Hoa Lo Prison and pose as German tourists. Operation Mole was cancelled after some of the participants were transferred out of the jail, and Air Force Colonel John Flynn, the Senior Ranking Officer at the time, decided that the chances of success were minimal and the probability of severe reprisals against the other POWs, extremely high. Operation Thunderhead offers no new insights on the American POW experience during the Vietnam War and limited new material on Operation Thunderhead. It is a work of popular history of little use to serious scholars of the war in Southeast Asia . Until more official documents are released on special operations in North Vietnamese territory, this chapter of the war will remain shrouded in mystery. Kevin Dockery, Operation Thunderhead: The True Story of Vietnam’s Final POW Rescue—And the Last Navy SEAL Killed in Country, Berkley Press, 2009. 294 pp., photos, appendix, index. Review by John Darrell Sherwood Naval History and Heritage Command