The Navy and The Nation : The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia

In putting together The Navy and the Nation David Stevens and John Reeve have assembled something far more valuable than a mere narrative history of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). In many regards it is an historical argument against taking something of great value for granted. At a time when navies the world over are having their funding cut and their worth questioned, the editors of this volume have cobbled together a significant statement of the enduring value of the RAN to the nation it serves. The book, a collection of essays drawn from the biennial King-Hall Naval History Conference, provides a plethora of examples detailing the immense contributions of the RAN to Australia . While there is no escaping the fact that this is a compilation of conference papers, and not a coherent narrative, it should not be dismissed as the intellectual equivalent of being made to eat leftovers. This is history written, compiled, and edited with a purpose. As a collection of arguments begging the consideration of a host of events, personalities, and contributions made either in connection with or on behalf of the RAN, The Navy and the Nation provides forceful testimony to the importance of this navy to its island nation. Rather than a single author advancing a thesis, Stevens and Reeve provide the theses of several writers that serve the greater purpose of demonstrating how the RAN has benefited Australia . Divided into four parts, the book has a sensible organization that carries readers from “concepts and contexts,” a Mahanian macro-view of Australia ’s place in an evolving naval epic, through sections entitled “the Navy and the nation,” “ships, industry and technology for Australia ,” and “naval people and the nation.” Among the 19 essays contained in these sections are those touching upon everything from hydrographic surveys, the RAN’s place in furthering the foreign policy aims of Australia ’s political leaders, the most famous ships to have served the nation, the historic importance of ship building in Australia , and the value of naval experience in the Australian populace. The most compelling of these essays extol the traditional strengths of navies while managing to place those strengths in particularly Australian contexts. The editors draw on a wide range of talents and the essays are representative of a vast expanse of knowledge. In some regards this compilation’s greatest strength, a wonderfully diverse testament to the value of navies, the RAN specifically, is also its greatest weakness. Lacking the coherence of a single storyline, this collection might seem to some readers as being a bit too all encompassing. However well the editors may have chosen individual essays to suit their purpose, the fact remains that this is a compilation that lacks natural transitions and it requires close attention if large sections are to be digested at a single reading. For instance, Neil Westphalen’s interesting account of the naval and medical services nexus is, in a strict sense, the only essay of its kind in the book. Similarly, Geoff Cannon’s contribution “Technology transfer, knowledge partnerships and the advance of Australian naval combat systems,” is more contemporary and in some regards more specialized than most of the other offerings. That quibble aside, the book’s essays make several cogent arguments that do great credit to the editors and the RAN. As unorthodox as this book might appear at first glance, it should be noted that it does contain impressive examples of what might best be called traditional naval history. The contributions of Geoffrey Till and David Stevens are perhaps the best offerings of this genre to be found in this collection. Till does an admirable job of setting a strategic backdrop upon which other developments/essays can best be viewed and Stevens offers a compelling, if not touching account of one of the most famous ships in the nation’s history. In many ways Stevens’ account of the life and death of HMAS Australia is reflective of the book’s aim to place the navy at the fore of the nation’s quest for identity. In general, it would be difficult not to be impressed with all that the RAN has contributed to Australia ’s rise as a nation, based upon the contents of this book. Whether one is interested in the history of navies in general, or of Australia’s navy alone, The Navy and the Nation contains a wealth of useful scholarship and is worthy of a place in the library of any student of naval history. David Stevens and John Reeve (eds.), The Navy and the Nation: The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia, Allen & Unwin, 2005. 438 pp., illustrations, pictures, endnotes, and index. Review by Charles Steele Department of History, United States Air Force Academy

Somalia: Lesson From the Past

1. Introduction

In the early 1990s, organisations such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) began to register reports of (attempted) piracy. As will become clear in this essay, the timing was not accidental. Piracy, as we know, is a contemporary phenomenon with a long history. That means that there are lessons to be drawn from the past.[1] It appears that the phenomenon of piracy has three aspects that have kept recurring throughout the centuries, and can also be discerned in the current events in the waters around Somalia , namely: piracy is primarily experienced and condemned by its victims; piracy is a phenomenon occurring at the periphery; people resort to piracy for an underlying reason. These three aspects of piracy will be examined in this short article. They will be illustrated by historical examples, after which we will focus on the situation in Somalia . 2. The Victims Piracy has been occurring since antiquity. Classical scholar Philip de Souza aptly articulated the notion that the term “piracy” stems mainly from the vocabulary of the victims. Piracy is a term normally applied in a pejorative manner. Pirates can be defined as armed robbers whose activities normally involve the use of ships. They are men who have been designated as such by other people, regardless of whether or not they consider themselves to be pirates.[2] Thus the term ‘piracy’ has a negative connotation, usually conveying a sense of moral judgement. Pirates are people who have been labelled as such by others, irrespective of whether they see themselves as pirates. The term “piracy” is therefore mainly used and qualified by its victims. A consequence of this is that those aggrieved by piracy are often ill-informed about its background. I will illustrate this with a number of examples from the recent past. From 1994, a dramatic increase was seen in the incidence of attempted piracy in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea . The number of reports rose from approximately 50 per year to almost 500 in the year 2000. It was not until 2005, however, before serious studies into illegal activities of this kind were published, including, D. Johnson and M. Valencia (eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses (Leiden/Singapore: IIAS, 2005), and A.J. Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia : History, Causes and Remedies (Leiden/Singapore: IIAS, 2007). Since then, the number of reports of piracy in the region has fallen to the approximate level of the mid-1990s and the focus of attention has, to some extent, shifted away from the region.[3] In March 2009, the RAND Corporation convened a small group of experts from the U.S. government, allied partner nations, the maritime industry, and academic organisations to reconsider the underlying factors that drive maritime piracy in the 21st century. Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from the workshop is that mitigating the complex nature of maritime crime requires the input of all relevant stakeholders – state, national, private, and non-governmental – and must necessarily embrace measures that go well beyond the simple and expedient reactive deployment of naval assets. However, no representatives from the region (Horn of Africa) had been invited.[4] This was also the case at the seminar of 8 July 2009 organised by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael under the title “Pioneering for Solutions Against Piracy: Focusing on a Geopolitical Analysis, Counter-Piracy Initiatives and Policy Solutions”. The seminar was concerned mainly with the Indian Ocean and Somalia : Participants in this seminar are academics, policy makers, and top-level military staff, from EU member states and institutions, NATO, and American universities, who all have a professional interest in the subject.[5] Apparently, it was thought that solutions for the problem of piracy could be found without the advice of representatives from the region. Just recently, UN special representative for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah said: “Piracy on the high seas cannot be fought by international naval fleets alone, but requires a regional approach that also deals with its root causes.” In my opinion not only an open door, but a little bit late as well.[6] 3. Piracy as a phenomenon at the periphery A study into the history of piracy reveals that piracy is a phenomenon which chiefly occurs at the periphery. In Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, Anne Pérotin-Dumon put it as follows: There is a description of piracy that spans the ages: illegal and armed aggression at points of maritime traffic that are important but under weak political control. The aggression is committed by the marginal who seek to appropriate the wealth of the more affluent, or by newcomers desiring to force their way into pre-existing trade routes.[7] The essence of this quotation lies, of course, in: “at points of maritime traffic that are important but under weak political control.” Piracy thus occurs in areas where (relatively) little political power is being exercised or can be exercised. Such areas are often located at the periphery, far removed from the centre of power. This demands some explanation. The process of state formation The period roughly between 1500 and 1800 is known as the Early Modern Period. This period is characterised by the rise of the “military fiscal state.” By the end of the Middle Ages, the emerging monetary economy had created the conditions enabling rulers to hire professional soldiers. Not only did this professionalization of warfare result in more conflicts, it also made them much more costly. Stronger governments were needed to generate higher revenue through taxation in order to finance increasingly expensive wars. In turn, the more powerful a state became, the more inclined it would be to wage wars. What emerged was a self-reinforcing spiral of wars, taxation and state formation.[8] During the Modern Period, roughly the period from 1800 to 1990, this development in the Western World led to the formation of nation-states, combining a powerful state with a population who considered themselves to be part of that state. Nationalism provided a sense of shared identity. Money was no longer required for building up an army and a fleet. Enormous conscript armies, raised on the basis of nationalism and a national identity, were now fighting each other. Since then, we have entered into the Post-modern Period, characterised by the diminishing influence of the state. This has brought about two developments in many armed forces. First of all, there was the transformation from conscript to all-professional armed forces in the mid-1990s. In that regard, we have returned to the situation of the Early Modern Period.[9] As for other parts of the world: not only have states become weaker, a few, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia , have even disappeared. Somalia has also effectively ceased to exist as a nation-state. In other words: the Somalian government, assuming there is such a thing, exercises very little political power. The fight against piracy Here is not the place to give a detailed description of piracy and what was and is being done to combat it. I will therefore limit myself to the four most significant periods that can be distinguished in the history of countering piracy since Early Modern times. The first period runs from the end of the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century. The increasingly powerful maritime states of Western Europe succeeded in suppressing piracy in the North and Baltic Seas . By 1650, merchant ships in Western European waters hardly needed protection any longer.[10] During the second period, the fight against piracy shifted to the Mediterranean . The activities of the Barbary corsairs, who operated from the Ottoman regencies of Tripoli , Algiers and Tunis and from independent Morocco , were viewed by Western powers as ordinary acts of piracy. It was not until the early nineteenth century, when particularly Spain and France brought their influence to bear in North Africa, that the Barbary corsairs disappeared from the scene for good.[11] The third period was the so-called war against piracy, which took place approximately from 1715 to 1730 when the Royal Navy waged a merciless campaign to suppress piracy in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean . Hundreds of pirates were hanged during this campaign.[12] The fourth and last period was during the nineteenth century when the Dutch and British colonial administrations dealt with the last pirates’ nests in Southeast Asia .[13] By around 1900, piracy had been eradicated. In 1925, the Harvard Law Review rhetorically asked: “Is the crime of Piracy Obsolete?” The answer given was affirmative. Piracy was mostly considered an interesting phenomenon from the past.[14] From a Western European perspective, the fight against piracy has seen a steady shift away from the centre. Whenever the Western European powers wished to exercise political control in the periphery of their spheres of influence, they were faced with combating piracy. By the time the Western colonial powers controlled about eighty percent of the world, the days of piracy were finished. The absence of piracy is thus a phenomenon of the modern era. During the 1980s, however, a major transition took place as the clear-cut bipolar world of the Cold War, with its two great power blocs whose influence extended throughout vast parts of the globe, transformed into a multi-polar world with a great deal more political instability, particularly at the periphery. It should therefore come as no surprise that in 1991 the IMB and IMO began to keep a register of reported attacks on seagoing vessels. As the Modern Period came to a close, piracy had once again reared its head (table 1). Table 1. Reported cases of piracy, 1991-2009 1991 107 1998 200 2000 471 2003 445 2004 329 2005 276 2006 239 2007 263 2008 293 2009 (first six months) 240 Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Reports Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, available on ICC webpage, URL: www.icc-ccs.org. Somalia On a local scale, this mechanism of political stability, or rather instability, can also be observed in Somalia . Piracy in Somalian waters started occurring about ten years ago. With the advent of the so-called Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in south Somalia in 2006 came the expectation that this new government would be able to curb piracy. But following the ousting of the ICU by, among others, Ethiopian troops, the last vestige of government disappeared and the incidence of piracy increased explosively (table 2).[15] Table 2. Piracy incidents near Somalia , 2003-2009 2003 18 2004 8 2005 10 2006 10 2007 13 2008 92 2009 (first six months) 130 Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Reports Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, available on ICC webpage, URL: www.icc-ccs.org. The lack of political control has historically been a essential precondition for piracy, but it is in itself not sufficient to explain the phenomenon. After all, there are other regions that are under very weak political control and yet have not seen the development of piracy. Examples are countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone .[16] 4. Causes History has shown that there is usually a reason or cause, explaining why people in regions with relatively little political control resort to piracy. I will offer two illustrative examples. The Dutch Sea Beggars Around 1560, there was something brewing in the Netherlands . There was widespread discontent about the centralist policies of the Habsburgs in Brussels , which violated the age-old privileges and customs of regional administrations. The long drawn-out wars waged by the rulers in Brussels against France were causing major harm to economic interests. At the same time, the new religious insights of Martin Luther and John Calvin found fertile soil in the Low Countries, a development towards which the government in Brussels was less than understanding. Tensions erupted in the autumn of 1566 with the outbreak of the Iconoclastic Fury, which drove King Philip II to dispatch his commander Don Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alva, to the Low Countries to restore order. This led a number of protestant exiles to revolt. Their supreme goal was to repel Alva and “restore” Protestantism, and they saw William of Orange as their leader. In addition to hijacking ships, they specialised in capturing dignitaries in order to collect a ransom, a practice known as “rationing” (rantsoenering). In the eyes of the Habsburg rulers, the Sea Beggars were nothing but ordinary pirates. The pirate activities of the Sea Beggars were thus ignited by the Netherlands ’ struggle for independence from Habsburg rule.[17] Pirates of the Caribbean The adventures of captain Jack Sparrow in the Pirates of the Caribbean movies by Walt Disney are inspired by the so-called golden age of piracy. Roughly between 1716 and 1726, approximately 1,500 to 2,500 pirates were operating from a total of twenty to thirty heavily armed ships in the West-Indies and the Atlantic Ocean . Marxist-oriented maritime historian Marcus Rediker believes that these sea-robbers formed a multicultural, democratic and egalitarian community and were the product of gross social injustice. In his view, they were the forerunners of the American and French revolutionaries. Here, the underlying cause of piracy was social inequality and the class struggle.[18] Somalia Diminishing fish stocks, caused by illegal fishing and illegal dumping of waste by Western companies, are generally assumed to be the reason why Somalian fishermen have resorted to piracy. In a BBC interview, the twenty-five year old Somali Dahir Mohamed Hayeysi declared: I used to be a fisherman with a poor family that depended only on fishing. The first day joining the pirates came into my mind was in 2006. A group of our villagers, mainly fishermen I knew, were arming themselves. One of them told me that they wanted to hijack ships, which he said were looting our sea resources. He told me it was a national service with a lot of money in the end. Then I took my gun and joined them. Years ago we used to fish a lot, enough for us to eat and sell in the markets. Then illegal fishing and dumping of toxic wastes by foreign fishing vessels affected our livelihood, depleting the fish stocks. I had no other choice but to join my colleagues. The first hijack I attended was in February 2007 when we seized a World Food Programme-chartered ship with 12 crew. I think it had the name of MV Rozen and we released it after two months, with a ransom. Now I have two lorries, a luxury car and have started my own business in town. The interview ends with the following statement: The only way the piracy can stop is if [ Somalia ] gets an effective government that can defend our fish. And then we will disarm, give our boats to that government and will be ready to work. Foreign navies can do nothing to stop piracy.[19] 5. Conclusion The conclusion should be clear: piracy will continue to exist as long as there are politically unstable regions located along important sea routes. As piracy is chiefly a result of political instability, it must be combated first of all on land.[20] This is both good and bad news for the navies currently operating near the Horn of Africa. The bad news is that the deployment of navy ships and the escorting of merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean will not bring about a decrease in piracy. With those efforts we are merely fighting the symptoms. As the Netherlands ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation informed the Dutch Parliament on March 13, 2009: Operation Allied Protector is a brief military contribution intended to combat the symptoms of piracy near the Horn of Africa while, in an international context, the transition process in Somalia and the implementation of the Djibouti agreement are being supported and a study is being conducted, through, among others, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, into how regional capacity building can contribute to countering piracy in the long term.[21] The good news is that the deployment of navy ships against Somalian pirates will continue for an indefinite period into the future. For now, the hope for peace in the region has faded and the Djibouti agreement has been consigned to the wastepaper basket. Strict Islamic groups appear to be gaining the upper hand. As has been shown by the Islamic Courts Union, such organisations will bring a certain degree of political stability, enabling the suppression of piracy. On the other hand, regimes of this kind are unacceptable to the West. The United States has recently sent 40 tonnes of weapons to Somalia . Direct intervention is, after all, an undesirable option, evidence of which is provided by 1993 US operation in Mogadishu (depicted in the movie Black Hawk Down). In my opinion, in Somalia the international community finds itself caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.[22] [1] D.J. Puchala, “Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach”, Contempory Security Policy 26 (April 2005) 1:1-24. [2] Ph. De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1. [3] “Southeast Asia Maritime Security Review, 3rd Quarter 2008” , available on the webpage of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, URL: www.rsis.edu.sg; IIAS Newsletter 36 (March, 2005); P. Gwin, “Dark Passage: The Straits of Malakka. Pirates Haunt it. Sailors Fear it. Global Trade Depends on it”, National Geographic (October, 2007) 126-149. [4] Peter Chalk, Laurence Smallman and Nicholas Burger, Countering Piracy in the Modern Era. Notes from a RAND Workshop to Discuss the Best Approaches for Dealing with Piracy in the 21st Century ( Washington : RAND Corporation, 2009). [5] “Discussion Paper Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme “Pioneering for Solutions Against Piracy” Focusing on a Geopolitical Analysis, Counter-piracy Initiatives and Policy Solutions”, available on the webpage of Clingendael, URL: www.Clingendael.nl. [6] AFP, “UN calls for multi-level approach in fighting piracy” (November 18, 2009), available on the webpage of Google: http://www.google.com. [7] A. Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450- 1850” , in C.R. Pennell (ed.), Bandits of the Sea: A Pirates Reader ( New York : New York University Press, 2001) 25. [8] Ch. Tilly, Coercian, Capital, and European States , AD 990-1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); R. Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995); P. Wilson, “European Warfare, 1450- 1815” , in J. Black (ed.), War in the Early Modern World, 1450-1815 (London: UCL Press, 1999) 177-206. [9] Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven. Een kwestie van verantwoordelijkheden (The Hague, 2007); J.M.D van Leeuwe, “De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven in operatiegebieden”, Militaire Spectator 177 (2008) 4:240-245. [10] V.W. Lunsford, Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands ( New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); J.C. Appleby, “A Nursery of Pirates: the English Pirate Community in Ireland in the Early 17th Century”, International Journal of Maritime History 2 (1990) 1:1-27; C. Senior, A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in its Heyday (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1976). [11] J. de Courcy Ireland, “Raïs Hamidou: The last of the Great Algerian Corsairs”, The Mariner’s Mirror 60 (1974) 2:187-196; D.J. Vitkus and N. Matar, Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001); D. Panzac, Barbary Corsairs: the End of a Legend, 1800-1820 (Leiden: Brill, 2005); N. Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005). [12] D. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and Reality of Life among the Pirates (New York: Harvast Book, 1995); Aaron Smith, The Atrocities of the Pirates (Guilford:The Lyons Press, 1999); J. Rogoziński, Honor among Thieves: Captain Kidd, Henry Every, and the Pirate Democracy in the Indian Ocean (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000); P. Earl, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2003). [13] J.N.F.M. à Campo, “Asymmetry, Disparity and Cyclicity: Charting the Piracy Conflict in Colonial Indonesia”, International Journal of Maritime History 19 (2007) 1:35-62; G. Teitler, A.M.C. van Dissel and J.N.F.M. à Campo, Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in de Indische archipel, 19de eeuw (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005). [14] E.D. Dickinson, “Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete”, Harvard Law Review 37 (1924/5) 334-36. [15] R. Middleton, Piracy in Somalia Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars (October, 2008), available on the webpage of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, URL: www.chathamhouse.org.uk. [16] D. Nincic, “State Failure and the Re-Emergence of Maritime Piracy”, available on the webpage of All Academic Research, URL: http://www.allacademic.com. [17] J.C.A. de Meij, De Watergeuzen en de Nederlanden, 1568-1572 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1972). [18] M. Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea : Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); M. Rediker, Villains of the Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age ( London : Verso, 2004). [19] “It’s a Pirate’s Life for Me”, available on the webpage of the BBC, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8010061.stm. [20] M. Schenkel, “Los zeeroverij op aan land. Effectief gezag in Somalië is vereiste voor uitbannen van piraterij”, NRC-Handelsblad (November 22, 2008). [21] Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingsamenwerking aan Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (29 521, nr. 93) (March 13, 2009). [22] K. Lindijer, “Hoop op vrede in Somalië is alweer vervlogen. Nieuwe gevechtsronde onafwendbaar door verdeeldheid, buitenlandse inmenging en criminele belangen”, NRC-Handelsblad (May 22, 2009); M.B. Sheridan, “U.S. has sent 40 Ton of Munition to Aid Somali Governemnt”, The Washington Post (June 27, 2009); K. Lindijer, “Al-Shabaab trekt strijders van overal aan”, NRC-Handelsbla (August 6, 2009).

In Search of Captain Cook: Exploring the Man Through His Own Words

It is reasonable to assume that everything that could possibly be written on the life and achievements of Captain James Cook has been written. However, in this brief, thematic look at this enigmatic British explorer, Dan O’Sullivan advances an interesting perspective. He makes no effort to overturn the definitive work on Cook – J.C. Beaglehole’s The Life of Captain James Cook – and he happily avoids either of the two partisan extremes usually associated with the subject of 18th and 19th century exploration: hagiographic treatments or the all-explorers-are-racist-imperialists school. Sullivan wisely skirts the more recent, largely esoteric debate between Gananath Obeyesekere and Marshall Sahlin as to whether Hawaiian islanders reaction to Cook indicated a “Western” rationality.

Instead, In Search of Captain Cook returns to what are practically the only surviving records – the logs from Cook’s three voyages – and tries to present an accurate portrait of the explorer’s personality by measuring it against several situational templates: how Cook interacted with the officers and men of his ships, Cook’s contribution to science and health, and his understanding and treatment of the native peoples he encountered. The process of unraveling the “real” James Cook is complicated. Aside from the logs, a handful of surviving letters, and the recorded impressions of but a few officers and men, there are scant primary sources. The traditional picture of Cook is of an almost stereotypical hero: brave, resolute, determined, and far-sighted. Even Cook’s murder in Hawaii in 1779 has an appropriately iconic feel to it. Any sense of humor or more prosaic personal trait is simply missing from the image we have. But, as O’Sullivan points out, even the best surviving sources can be misleading. When Cook returned in 1771 from his first voyage on HM Bark Endeavor, both the Royal Navy and government were quick to appreciate the domestic public relations benefit of Cook’s words and deeds. They considered, however, that Cook’s diction needed polishing, and so the more fluent writer John Hawkesworth was hired to shepherd the book to press. Not only did Hawkesworth reword some of Cook’s more stoic and technical diary entries, but he used the works of other voyage participants (principally botanist Joseph Banks) to augment Cook, merging them all into what appeared to be a seamless whole, and presenting the completed package as the unvarnished thoughts and actions of Britain’s newest hero. The fact is that James Cook was a self-taught naval officer, not a professional writer. He recorded his log entries in such a way as to keep an accurate record of information intended to assist other ships’ captains. Talk of tides, winds, and locations in minutes, degrees, and seconds might be essential for another seaman, but were judged to be excess for the well-read target audience. Cook was displeased with the artificial result, and during the course of his next voyage (1774-1776), he kept the public end-goal in mind. Accordingly he went through several drafts of his own log entries, gradually improving as a less-technical writer. To get even close to the truth of James Cook, then, it is necessary to plumb his original words and thoughts, not those later adapted by others for public consumption. O’Sullivan’s statement that “Since Cook’s death there have been many Cooks,” refers to the praise or damnation heaped upon James Cook by authors living in different eras, with different axes to grind. It is an accurate assessment. Stripping away the myth – some of it started even in Cook’s lifetime – is a challenging business.

The author’s James Cook comes across as a human being, not a statue. He has likes and dislikes (he refers to the Malekulans of the New Hebrides, for instance, as “the most ugly and ill proportioned people I ever saw”), opinions – some of them prescient, some erroneous; he has a sense of obligation to his crew and the people he encounters; he operates from a singular sense of duty and purpose. While not afraid to flog offending sailors, he nevertheless provides intelligent leadership in places that could not be more remote or different from the Yorkshire village where he was born. Cook was in almost every sense a scientist, although even that word was unknown to his era. He understood the importance of diet on crew health but never made the critical link to citrus fruit (he advocated fresh meat and vegetables); he displayed a delicate understanding of diverse cultures, and the possible negative impact of Western society on those cultures weighed heavily on him despite his duty to make first contact. Cook makes errors, too, but generally ones that are understandable when viewed through an 18th century lens – and even his final error on Hawaii fits into this paradigm. The debate over the nature and significance of James Cook and his voyages will certainly continue. In Search of Captain Cook is a welcome addition to that search for meaning. Dan O’Sullivan, In Search of Captain Cook: Exploring the Man Through His Own Words, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2008. 233 pp., illustrations, references, suggested reading, index. Review by Mark M. Hull Department of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Operation Thunderhead: The True Story of Vietnam’s Final POW Rescue—And the Last Navy SEAL Killed in Country

The story of the American prisoners of war (POW) in Vietnam has been told many times with the definitive account being Stuart Rochester and Frederick Kiley’s Honor Bound: The History of American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973 (Naval Institute Press, 1998). This “new” POW book by Kevin Dockery re-hashes the story of John Dramesi’s ill-fated May 1969 escape attempt and ends with a coda about an aborted June 1972 U.S. Navy special operations mission to assist Dramesi in a second attempt that never happened. Air Force Captain John Dramesi was a brash young officer from South Philadelphia who in May of 1969 made a daring escape attempt from the “Zoo Annex” prison in Hanoi with fellow Air Force Captain Ed Atterberry. The two men planned to break out of the camp disguised as Vietnamese peasants, steal a sampan, and paddle down the Red River to the Gulf of Tonkin , where they hoped to be picked up by the U.S. Navy. Escaping from the prison proved to be the easiest part of the mission, but the two men never fully considered how they would be able to travel over 110 miles through hostile, heavily populated territory to the coast. The fact that neither man was of Asian heritage or spoke Vietnamese compounded their difficulties. The escape attempt occurred without the blessings of compound’s senior ranking POW, Air Force Captain Konrad Trautman. Trautman felt he could not order Dramesi and Atterbery to cancel the attempt because the Code of Conduct specifically demanded that POWs make every effort to escape, but he did believe that the attempt was ill-advised and could cause severe repercussions for other POWs held at the Zoo Annex. The two men escaped from the compound at night by crawling through an attic above the cells and clamoring down the roof of the facility to the street. A North Vietnamese patrol discovered the two men at sunup the next day in a bramble thicket about four miles from the Zoo Annex. Over the course of the next two months, the prison authorities severely tortured the two escapees plus two dozen other American POWs. One officer, Lieutenant Eugene “Red” McDaniel, received 700 lashes as well as electric shocks and a form of rope torture during the ordeal, which he called his “darkest hour.” After seven days of severe torture, Atterbery died—a death Dockery attributes to pneumonia, but which Rochester and Kiley argue had to have been caused by excessive torture and medical neglect. Dockery, a “radio broadcaster, gunsmith, and historian” and the author of a number of popular histories of the SEALs, staunchly defends Dramesi throughout the book as an American hero. But other historians of the POW experience view his actions in a more critical light. Rochester and Kiley define him as an “accident waiting to happen,” whose actions caused unnecessary pain and suffering for their fellow POWs. Operation Thunderhead also yields no new information on Dramesi or his escape, and because no sources are cited in the book, I am left wondering if Dockery even interviewed Dramesis or simply constructed his narrative from Dramesi’s memoir Code of Honor (Norton, 1975). There are also some embarrassing errors in the book, such as the misspelling Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Robinson Risner’s last name, “Reisner,” in several places in the book. A Korean War ace, Risner was one of the longest serving senior officers in the Hanoi Hilton, and the recipient of the Air Force Cross. Any historian of the American POW experience should have been able to spell his name properly. But what irritates this reviewer the most about Operation Thunderhead is the book’s misleading title. Only the last 62 pages of the book focus on the SEAL effort to assist Dramesi in a second escape bid in the spring of 1972. This portion of the book focuses solely on the SEAL operation to penetrate North Vietnamese territory, using the special operations submarine Grayback (LPSS 574). According to Dockery, the SEAL mission was plagued by problems from the very onset. During an attempt to land on an island in the Red River , a SEAL Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) ran out of battery power while fighting the strong currents of the river, forcing the 4-man SEAL and Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) crew to abort the mission, and destroy the SDV. After being rescued by helicopter and transported to Long Beach (CGN 9), the four operators attempted to return to Grayback by dropping from a helicopter and diving to the boat, but in the insertion attempt, one of the SEALs, Lieutenant Spence Dry, hit the water too hard and died, and several of the others were badly injured. A rescue helicopter eventually retrieved Dry’s corpse along with the three survivors. Communications difficulties had prevented Dry from informing Grayback of their attempted return to the boat, and so the boat launched a second SDV before their jump. This SDV, however, sunk almost immediately after launch, forcing the operators to scramble out of the vehicle and swim to the surface, where they were eventually rescued by a helicopter. The SEALs planned to make a third attempt with an inflatable boat, but this attempt was ultimately cancelled after the Grayback’s commanding officer suddenly shifted his boat’s location upon hearing chains being dragged near his boat. Dockery does not reveal his sources for this section of the book either, but presumably, he gleaned his details from interviews with some of the surviving special operations personnel. No official documents or after action reports are cited. The author also does not discuss Operation Mole—Dramesi’s second escape plan in which he and several others were to tunnel out of Hoa Lo Prison and pose as German tourists. Operation Mole was cancelled after some of the participants were transferred out of the jail, and Air Force Colonel John Flynn, the Senior Ranking Officer at the time, decided that the chances of success were minimal and the probability of severe reprisals against the other POWs, extremely high. Operation Thunderhead offers no new insights on the American POW experience during the Vietnam War and limited new material on Operation Thunderhead. It is a work of popular history of little use to serious scholars of the war in Southeast Asia . Until more official documents are released on special operations in North Vietnamese territory, this chapter of the war will remain shrouded in mystery. Kevin Dockery, Operation Thunderhead: The True Story of Vietnam’s Final POW Rescue—And the Last Navy SEAL Killed in Country, Berkley Press, 2009. 294 pp., photos, appendix, index. Review by John Darrell Sherwood Naval History and Heritage Command

Menanti Kapal Selam Buatan Indonesia

Indonesia segera menambah kekuatan armada laut dengan membuat kapal selam sendiri. Dua kapal selam itu rencananya akan dikerjakan mulai awal 2012. Keduanya direncanakan memperbarui alat utama sistem senjata (alutsista) yang selama ini dinilai ketinggalan zaman.

"Awal 2012 sudah bisa mulai dibuat. Kalau tidak keduanya ya dibuat satu dulu," kata Kepala Pusat Komunikasi Kementerian Pertahanan, Brigjen Hartind Asrin.

Dua kekuatan kapal selam baru ini diharapkan mampu menambal sejumlah kelemahan pertahanan laut Indonesia. Kedua kapal selam itu juga akan dilengkapi teknologi militer terbaru.

Namun Hartind masih merahasiakan teknologi yang akan dipasang di kedua kapal selam ini. "Cari saja teknologi kapal selam paling mutakhir. Itu yang akan kita pasang nanti," kata dia.

Menurut dia, dua kapal itu akan dibangun dengan sistem joint production bersama negara lain. Sejumlah negara sudah dijajaki, dan proposal kerja sama sudah disebar. Namun, dia menolak menyebut ke negara mana saja proposal itu diedarkan. "Bagian itu rahasia," kata dia.

Hartind mengatakan, kepastian negara rekanan itu baru bisa diketahui akhir tahun ini. "Setelah lebaran mungkin sudah bisa diketahui," kata dia.

Pembuatan dua kapal selam ini ditargetkan selesai dalam waktu tiga hingga empat tahun. Namun, Hartind mengatakan kapal selam bisa kelar lebih cepat dari target itu, jika negara rekanan telah memiliki kapal yang sudah dibuat. "Tergantung negara rekanan nanti. Kalau dia sudah punya kapal yang sudah mulai dibuat, sudah 50 persen misalnya, berarti bisa lebih cepat selesainya," kata Hartind.

Sementara itu, pengamat militer, Andi Wijayanto mengatakan beberapa negara berpotensi menjadi rekanan Indonesia untuk membuat kapal selam ini. Dia menyebut Korea Selatan, Prancis, Rusia, China, dan Jerman bisa menjadi rekanan.

Namun, lanjut dia, Korea Selatan dan Prancis menjadi negara terakhir yang melaju dalam seleksi rekanan Indonesia. "Rusia, China, dan Jerman tak akan menawarkan lagi konsep kapal selam," kata dia.

Menurut Andi, teknologi dua kapal selam yang akan dibuat itu tak akan jauh dari dua kapal selam tipe U-209 yang saat ini dimiliki Indonesia.

Dia menambahkan, dua kapal selam yang akan berpotensi dibuat Indonesia adalah kapal selam mini. Rancang bangun kapal ini akan dibuat PT PAL, Surabaya. Sementara itu, kapal selam kedua adalah jenis diesel yang akan dibuat oleh negara rekanan.

Kemandirian

Menurut Hartind, selain memperkuat armada laut, tujuan pembuatan kapal selam dengan sistem joint production ini untuk menumbuhkan kemandirian Indonesia dalam memenuhi persenjataan pertahanannya.

Dengan program ini diharapkan terjadi proses alih teknologi kepada Indonesia. "Kita harus bisa mandiri supaya peralatan militer tidak tergantung dengan negara lain," kata dia.

"Kalau tergantung, begitu diembargo kita tidak akan kesulitan lagi. Embargo sama dengan ancaman negara."

Pembuatan kapal selam ini juga direncanakan menggunakan komponen lokal, khususnya kapal yang dibuat oleh PT PAL. "Meski demikian, kita jamin kualitasnya bagus," kata dia.

"Kalau kapal yang dibuat di negara rekanan kemungkinan komponennya sebagian besar masih datang dari luar."

Kebutuhan ideal

Renstra TNI AL menyebutkan pada tahun 2024 idealnya Indonesia memiliki 10 unit kapal selam. Jumlah itu dinilai akan mampu menjaga kedaulatan wilayah NKRI yang sebagian besar terdiri dari lautan.

Dalam sistem pertahanan, kapal selam ini sangat diperlukan terutama bagi laut di kawasan timur Indonesia. "Di timur lautnya sangat dalam, sehingga cocok untuk kapal selam," kata Hartind. Kawasan barat lautnya dangkal, sehingga lebih tepat untuk kapal permukaan.

Andi Wijayanto, mengatakan kawasan timur Indonesia selama ini dijadikan jalur lalu lintas kapal selam negara lain. Sedikitnya, kata Andi, ada tiga titik rawan yang harus dijaga dengan menggunakan kapal selam. "Laut Sulawesi, Laut Aru, dan Laut Natuna," ujarnya.

Dari tiga titik itu, Laut Sulawesi dan Laut Aru adalah titik rawan bagi pertahanan laut Indonesia. "Di dua titik itu, lalu lintas kapal selam negara lain sering melintas dari Laut Pasifik ke Samudra Hindia," kata dia. Kapal selam Australia, Jepang, China, Rusia, dan Amerika menggunakan jalur itu. "Titik rawan ini harus dijaga dengan menempatkan kapal selam".

Anggaran cekak

Ongkos pembuatan dua kapal selam itu telah dimasukkan dalam anggaran pertahanan 2010/2011. Hartind mengatakan Indonesia akan memilih negara rekanan yang menawarkan harga paling rendah dengan kualitas terbaik. "Kita pilih negara yang menawarkan harga paling rendah dengan kualitas yang bagus," kata dia.

Terkait anggaran pertahanan, Andi Wijayanto sangat menyayangkan alokasi dana yang diberikan. Menurut dia, anggaran untuk pertahanan Indonesia terlalu cekak.

Dia menambahkan, Indonesia tak akan mampu memenuhi kebutuhan minimal 10 kapal selam pada 2024. "Karena alokasi anggaran di masa pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tidak pernah mencapai kebutuhan. Selalu defisit," kata Andi.

Untuk mengejar target ideal itu, terlalu berat bagi Indonesia. Untuk saat ini saja, kata Andi, harusnya anggaran pertahanan itu sekitar Rp70 triliun lebih. "Saat ini alokasi di negara kita belum pernah tembus Rp50 triliun," kata dia.

Armada selam saat ini

Saat ini, Indonesia hanya memiliki dua kapal selam, yaitu KRI Cakra (401) dan KRI Nanggal (402). Dua kapal itu merupakan tipe 209 buatan Jerman.

KRI Cakra dan Nanggala dibuat oleh Howaldtswerke, Kiel, Jerman pada 1981. Dari umurnya jelas sudah tua, dan merupakan kapal selam tipe 209/1300.
Kapal Selam Cakra 401
Tenaganya digerakkan oleh motor listrik Siemens jenis low-speed disalurkan langsung (tanpa gear pengurang putaran) melalui sebuah shaft ke baling-baling kapal. Total daya yang dikirim adalah 5000 shp (shaft horse power).

Tenaga motor listrik datang dari baterai besar yang beratnya sekitar 25% dari berat kapal. Baterai dibuat oleh Varta (low power) dan Hagen (Hi-power). Tenaga baterai diisi oleh generator yang diputar 4 buah mesin diesel MTU jenis supercharged.

Senjata terdiri dari 14 buah terpedo buatan AEG , diincar melalui periskop buatan Zeiss yang diletakkan disamping snorkel buatan Maschinenbau Gabler.

Kedua kapal selam memiliki berat selam 1,395 ton. Dengan dimensi 59,5 meter x 6,3 meter x 5,5 meter. Diperkuat oleh mesin diesel elektrik, 4 diesel, 1 shaft menghasilkan 4,600 shp, yang sanggup mendorong kapal hingga kecepatan 21,5 knot. Kapal itu diawaki oleh 34 pelaut.

Sebagai bagian dari armada pemukul KRI Cakra dan Nanggala dipersenjatai 14 buah torpedo 21 inci dalam 8 tabung. Keduanya memiliki sonar dari jenis CSU-3-2 suite.(np)
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First Greek Type 214 Submarine Finally Enters Service

HS Papanikolis was belatedly commissioned into the Hellenic Navy on 2 November in Kiel, six and a half years after the boat was launched. (Michael Nitz)

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The Hellenic Navy commissioned its first Type 214 submarine in a ceremony at shipbuilder Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft's (HDW's) yard in Kiel, Germany, on 2 November.
HS Papanikolis, which is expected to arrive in Greece in December, was at the centre of a long-running contractual dispute between HDW parent company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and the Greek government.
Athens claimed initially that the submarine, which was launched by HDW in April 2004, was not completely seaworthy and refused to accept the boat. Germany's Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement subsequently demonstrated that the vessel not only complied with stability requirements but significantly exceeded other performance parameters, whereupon Greece said that it would take the boat and sell it on to a third party.
However, as Jane's reported in late October, it has now been decided that the Hellenic Navy will operate Papanikolis as the lead vessel in a class that will eventually number six Type 214 hulls.

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Copyright © IHS (Global) Limited, 2010

Rusia Dan Pangkalan AL

MOSKWA, MINGGU - Para pemimpin militer Rusia, Minggu (4/1), menyetujui rencana angkatan laut negara itu untuk membangun sejumlah pangkalan AL permanen di sejumlah pelabuhan laut milik negara-negara yang bersahabat dengan Rusia.

AL Rusia kini memang mulai membangun kembali kekuatannya dan mulai menunjukkan terlibat dalam operasi mengejar para perompak di lepas pantai Somalia, serta melakukan latihan perang dengan sejumlah negara sekutu Rusia di Amerika Selatan.

”Para jenderal telah menyampaikan pandangannya dalam masalah ini dan sepenuhnya mendukung posisi komite utama (angkatan laut),” tutur Wakil Kepala Staf Umum Jenderal Anatoly Nogovitsyn.

Dia menguraikan, Rusia telah melakukan perundingan langsung dengan beberapa pemerintah dari negara-negara sahabat Rusia untuk penempatan kapal-kapal perangnya secara permanen di beberapa pangkalan di seluruh belahan dunia.

”Tidak seorang pun bisa meramalkan di mana permasalahan bisa meledak. Yang kami butuhkan adalah sebuah pangkalan permanen, tetapi ini tentu saja sangat mahal. Hal ini harus dipertimbangkan dengan hati-hati,” papar Nogovitsyn.

Kantor berita Rusia RIA Novosti melaporkan, AL Rusia sudah berunding untuk membangun sebuah pangkalan laut permanen di Laut Hitam, di wilayah Abkhazia, yang mendapat dukungan Rusia untuk memisahkan diri dari Georgia.

Berkunjung di Turki

Sementara itu, Senin (5/1), menurut seorang juru bicara AL Rusia, sebuah gugus tugas AL Rusia dari armada utara tengah melakukan kunjungan tidak resmi di Turki.

”Hari ini, pada 5 Januari, konvoi kapal perang armada utara yang dipimpin oleh kapal induk Admiral Kuznetsov dan kapal perusak Admiral Levchenko tiba di pangkalan angkatan laut Akzas (Turki) untuk sebuah kunjungan informal,” ungkap Kapten Igor Dygalo kepada RIA Novosti.

Dia menambahkan, dalam kunjungan itu, kapal induk Admiral Levchenko akan merapat di pelabuhan, sementara kapal Admiral Kuznetsov berada di laut. Kunjungan itu dijadwalkan hingga Kamis, di mana setelah itu armada Rusia itu akan melakukan latihan bersama dengan AL Turki sebelum kembali melaksanakan tugasnya di Laut Mediterania.

Jubir AL Rusia itu juga menjelaskan, kapal induk berukuran lebih besar Admiral Chabanenko saat ini dalam perjalanan kembali ke pangkalan armada utara, setelah melakukan latihan bersama di Amerika Selatan, termasuk mengunjungi Venezuela dan Kuba. Venezuela dan Kuba dikenal sebagai sekutu Rusia di kawasan itu. (OKI)