The Navy and The Nation : The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia

In putting together The Navy and the Nation David Stevens and John Reeve have assembled something far more valuable than a mere narrative history of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). In many regards it is an historical argument against taking something of great value for granted. At a time when navies the world over are having their funding cut and their worth questioned, the editors of this volume have cobbled together a significant statement of the enduring value of the RAN to the nation it serves. The book, a collection of essays drawn from the biennial King-Hall Naval History Conference, provides a plethora of examples detailing the immense contributions of the RAN to Australia . While there is no escaping the fact that this is a compilation of conference papers, and not a coherent narrative, it should not be dismissed as the intellectual equivalent of being made to eat leftovers. This is history written, compiled, and edited with a purpose. As a collection of arguments begging the consideration of a host of events, personalities, and contributions made either in connection with or on behalf of the RAN, The Navy and the Nation provides forceful testimony to the importance of this navy to its island nation. Rather than a single author advancing a thesis, Stevens and Reeve provide the theses of several writers that serve the greater purpose of demonstrating how the RAN has benefited Australia . Divided into four parts, the book has a sensible organization that carries readers from “concepts and contexts,” a Mahanian macro-view of Australia ’s place in an evolving naval epic, through sections entitled “the Navy and the nation,” “ships, industry and technology for Australia ,” and “naval people and the nation.” Among the 19 essays contained in these sections are those touching upon everything from hydrographic surveys, the RAN’s place in furthering the foreign policy aims of Australia ’s political leaders, the most famous ships to have served the nation, the historic importance of ship building in Australia , and the value of naval experience in the Australian populace. The most compelling of these essays extol the traditional strengths of navies while managing to place those strengths in particularly Australian contexts. The editors draw on a wide range of talents and the essays are representative of a vast expanse of knowledge. In some regards this compilation’s greatest strength, a wonderfully diverse testament to the value of navies, the RAN specifically, is also its greatest weakness. Lacking the coherence of a single storyline, this collection might seem to some readers as being a bit too all encompassing. However well the editors may have chosen individual essays to suit their purpose, the fact remains that this is a compilation that lacks natural transitions and it requires close attention if large sections are to be digested at a single reading. For instance, Neil Westphalen’s interesting account of the naval and medical services nexus is, in a strict sense, the only essay of its kind in the book. Similarly, Geoff Cannon’s contribution “Technology transfer, knowledge partnerships and the advance of Australian naval combat systems,” is more contemporary and in some regards more specialized than most of the other offerings. That quibble aside, the book’s essays make several cogent arguments that do great credit to the editors and the RAN. As unorthodox as this book might appear at first glance, it should be noted that it does contain impressive examples of what might best be called traditional naval history. The contributions of Geoffrey Till and David Stevens are perhaps the best offerings of this genre to be found in this collection. Till does an admirable job of setting a strategic backdrop upon which other developments/essays can best be viewed and Stevens offers a compelling, if not touching account of one of the most famous ships in the nation’s history. In many ways Stevens’ account of the life and death of HMAS Australia is reflective of the book’s aim to place the navy at the fore of the nation’s quest for identity. In general, it would be difficult not to be impressed with all that the RAN has contributed to Australia ’s rise as a nation, based upon the contents of this book. Whether one is interested in the history of navies in general, or of Australia’s navy alone, The Navy and the Nation contains a wealth of useful scholarship and is worthy of a place in the library of any student of naval history. David Stevens and John Reeve (eds.), The Navy and the Nation: The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia, Allen & Unwin, 2005. 438 pp., illustrations, pictures, endnotes, and index. Review by Charles Steele Department of History, United States Air Force Academy

Somalia: Lesson From the Past

1. Introduction

In the early 1990s, organisations such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) began to register reports of (attempted) piracy. As will become clear in this essay, the timing was not accidental. Piracy, as we know, is a contemporary phenomenon with a long history. That means that there are lessons to be drawn from the past.[1] It appears that the phenomenon of piracy has three aspects that have kept recurring throughout the centuries, and can also be discerned in the current events in the waters around Somalia , namely: piracy is primarily experienced and condemned by its victims; piracy is a phenomenon occurring at the periphery; people resort to piracy for an underlying reason. These three aspects of piracy will be examined in this short article. They will be illustrated by historical examples, after which we will focus on the situation in Somalia . 2. The Victims Piracy has been occurring since antiquity. Classical scholar Philip de Souza aptly articulated the notion that the term “piracy” stems mainly from the vocabulary of the victims. Piracy is a term normally applied in a pejorative manner. Pirates can be defined as armed robbers whose activities normally involve the use of ships. They are men who have been designated as such by other people, regardless of whether or not they consider themselves to be pirates.[2] Thus the term ‘piracy’ has a negative connotation, usually conveying a sense of moral judgement. Pirates are people who have been labelled as such by others, irrespective of whether they see themselves as pirates. The term “piracy” is therefore mainly used and qualified by its victims. A consequence of this is that those aggrieved by piracy are often ill-informed about its background. I will illustrate this with a number of examples from the recent past. From 1994, a dramatic increase was seen in the incidence of attempted piracy in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea . The number of reports rose from approximately 50 per year to almost 500 in the year 2000. It was not until 2005, however, before serious studies into illegal activities of this kind were published, including, D. Johnson and M. Valencia (eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses (Leiden/Singapore: IIAS, 2005), and A.J. Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia : History, Causes and Remedies (Leiden/Singapore: IIAS, 2007). Since then, the number of reports of piracy in the region has fallen to the approximate level of the mid-1990s and the focus of attention has, to some extent, shifted away from the region.[3] In March 2009, the RAND Corporation convened a small group of experts from the U.S. government, allied partner nations, the maritime industry, and academic organisations to reconsider the underlying factors that drive maritime piracy in the 21st century. Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn from the workshop is that mitigating the complex nature of maritime crime requires the input of all relevant stakeholders – state, national, private, and non-governmental – and must necessarily embrace measures that go well beyond the simple and expedient reactive deployment of naval assets. However, no representatives from the region (Horn of Africa) had been invited.[4] This was also the case at the seminar of 8 July 2009 organised by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael under the title “Pioneering for Solutions Against Piracy: Focusing on a Geopolitical Analysis, Counter-Piracy Initiatives and Policy Solutions”. The seminar was concerned mainly with the Indian Ocean and Somalia : Participants in this seminar are academics, policy makers, and top-level military staff, from EU member states and institutions, NATO, and American universities, who all have a professional interest in the subject.[5] Apparently, it was thought that solutions for the problem of piracy could be found without the advice of representatives from the region. Just recently, UN special representative for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah said: “Piracy on the high seas cannot be fought by international naval fleets alone, but requires a regional approach that also deals with its root causes.” In my opinion not only an open door, but a little bit late as well.[6] 3. Piracy as a phenomenon at the periphery A study into the history of piracy reveals that piracy is a phenomenon which chiefly occurs at the periphery. In Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, Anne Pérotin-Dumon put it as follows: There is a description of piracy that spans the ages: illegal and armed aggression at points of maritime traffic that are important but under weak political control. The aggression is committed by the marginal who seek to appropriate the wealth of the more affluent, or by newcomers desiring to force their way into pre-existing trade routes.[7] The essence of this quotation lies, of course, in: “at points of maritime traffic that are important but under weak political control.” Piracy thus occurs in areas where (relatively) little political power is being exercised or can be exercised. Such areas are often located at the periphery, far removed from the centre of power. This demands some explanation. The process of state formation The period roughly between 1500 and 1800 is known as the Early Modern Period. This period is characterised by the rise of the “military fiscal state.” By the end of the Middle Ages, the emerging monetary economy had created the conditions enabling rulers to hire professional soldiers. Not only did this professionalization of warfare result in more conflicts, it also made them much more costly. Stronger governments were needed to generate higher revenue through taxation in order to finance increasingly expensive wars. In turn, the more powerful a state became, the more inclined it would be to wage wars. What emerged was a self-reinforcing spiral of wars, taxation and state formation.[8] During the Modern Period, roughly the period from 1800 to 1990, this development in the Western World led to the formation of nation-states, combining a powerful state with a population who considered themselves to be part of that state. Nationalism provided a sense of shared identity. Money was no longer required for building up an army and a fleet. Enormous conscript armies, raised on the basis of nationalism and a national identity, were now fighting each other. Since then, we have entered into the Post-modern Period, characterised by the diminishing influence of the state. This has brought about two developments in many armed forces. First of all, there was the transformation from conscript to all-professional armed forces in the mid-1990s. In that regard, we have returned to the situation of the Early Modern Period.[9] As for other parts of the world: not only have states become weaker, a few, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia , have even disappeared. Somalia has also effectively ceased to exist as a nation-state. In other words: the Somalian government, assuming there is such a thing, exercises very little political power. The fight against piracy Here is not the place to give a detailed description of piracy and what was and is being done to combat it. I will therefore limit myself to the four most significant periods that can be distinguished in the history of countering piracy since Early Modern times. The first period runs from the end of the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century. The increasingly powerful maritime states of Western Europe succeeded in suppressing piracy in the North and Baltic Seas . By 1650, merchant ships in Western European waters hardly needed protection any longer.[10] During the second period, the fight against piracy shifted to the Mediterranean . The activities of the Barbary corsairs, who operated from the Ottoman regencies of Tripoli , Algiers and Tunis and from independent Morocco , were viewed by Western powers as ordinary acts of piracy. It was not until the early nineteenth century, when particularly Spain and France brought their influence to bear in North Africa, that the Barbary corsairs disappeared from the scene for good.[11] The third period was the so-called war against piracy, which took place approximately from 1715 to 1730 when the Royal Navy waged a merciless campaign to suppress piracy in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean . Hundreds of pirates were hanged during this campaign.[12] The fourth and last period was during the nineteenth century when the Dutch and British colonial administrations dealt with the last pirates’ nests in Southeast Asia .[13] By around 1900, piracy had been eradicated. In 1925, the Harvard Law Review rhetorically asked: “Is the crime of Piracy Obsolete?” The answer given was affirmative. Piracy was mostly considered an interesting phenomenon from the past.[14] From a Western European perspective, the fight against piracy has seen a steady shift away from the centre. Whenever the Western European powers wished to exercise political control in the periphery of their spheres of influence, they were faced with combating piracy. By the time the Western colonial powers controlled about eighty percent of the world, the days of piracy were finished. The absence of piracy is thus a phenomenon of the modern era. During the 1980s, however, a major transition took place as the clear-cut bipolar world of the Cold War, with its two great power blocs whose influence extended throughout vast parts of the globe, transformed into a multi-polar world with a great deal more political instability, particularly at the periphery. It should therefore come as no surprise that in 1991 the IMB and IMO began to keep a register of reported attacks on seagoing vessels. As the Modern Period came to a close, piracy had once again reared its head (table 1). Table 1. Reported cases of piracy, 1991-2009 1991 107 1998 200 2000 471 2003 445 2004 329 2005 276 2006 239 2007 263 2008 293 2009 (first six months) 240 Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Reports Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, available on ICC webpage, URL: www.icc-ccs.org. Somalia On a local scale, this mechanism of political stability, or rather instability, can also be observed in Somalia . Piracy in Somalian waters started occurring about ten years ago. With the advent of the so-called Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in south Somalia in 2006 came the expectation that this new government would be able to curb piracy. But following the ousting of the ICU by, among others, Ethiopian troops, the last vestige of government disappeared and the incidence of piracy increased explosively (table 2).[15] Table 2. Piracy incidents near Somalia , 2003-2009 2003 18 2004 8 2005 10 2006 10 2007 13 2008 92 2009 (first six months) 130 Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Reports Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, available on ICC webpage, URL: www.icc-ccs.org. The lack of political control has historically been a essential precondition for piracy, but it is in itself not sufficient to explain the phenomenon. After all, there are other regions that are under very weak political control and yet have not seen the development of piracy. Examples are countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone .[16] 4. Causes History has shown that there is usually a reason or cause, explaining why people in regions with relatively little political control resort to piracy. I will offer two illustrative examples. The Dutch Sea Beggars Around 1560, there was something brewing in the Netherlands . There was widespread discontent about the centralist policies of the Habsburgs in Brussels , which violated the age-old privileges and customs of regional administrations. The long drawn-out wars waged by the rulers in Brussels against France were causing major harm to economic interests. At the same time, the new religious insights of Martin Luther and John Calvin found fertile soil in the Low Countries, a development towards which the government in Brussels was less than understanding. Tensions erupted in the autumn of 1566 with the outbreak of the Iconoclastic Fury, which drove King Philip II to dispatch his commander Don Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alva, to the Low Countries to restore order. This led a number of protestant exiles to revolt. Their supreme goal was to repel Alva and “restore” Protestantism, and they saw William of Orange as their leader. In addition to hijacking ships, they specialised in capturing dignitaries in order to collect a ransom, a practice known as “rationing” (rantsoenering). In the eyes of the Habsburg rulers, the Sea Beggars were nothing but ordinary pirates. The pirate activities of the Sea Beggars were thus ignited by the Netherlands ’ struggle for independence from Habsburg rule.[17] Pirates of the Caribbean The adventures of captain Jack Sparrow in the Pirates of the Caribbean movies by Walt Disney are inspired by the so-called golden age of piracy. Roughly between 1716 and 1726, approximately 1,500 to 2,500 pirates were operating from a total of twenty to thirty heavily armed ships in the West-Indies and the Atlantic Ocean . Marxist-oriented maritime historian Marcus Rediker believes that these sea-robbers formed a multicultural, democratic and egalitarian community and were the product of gross social injustice. In his view, they were the forerunners of the American and French revolutionaries. Here, the underlying cause of piracy was social inequality and the class struggle.[18] Somalia Diminishing fish stocks, caused by illegal fishing and illegal dumping of waste by Western companies, are generally assumed to be the reason why Somalian fishermen have resorted to piracy. In a BBC interview, the twenty-five year old Somali Dahir Mohamed Hayeysi declared: I used to be a fisherman with a poor family that depended only on fishing. The first day joining the pirates came into my mind was in 2006. A group of our villagers, mainly fishermen I knew, were arming themselves. One of them told me that they wanted to hijack ships, which he said were looting our sea resources. He told me it was a national service with a lot of money in the end. Then I took my gun and joined them. Years ago we used to fish a lot, enough for us to eat and sell in the markets. Then illegal fishing and dumping of toxic wastes by foreign fishing vessels affected our livelihood, depleting the fish stocks. I had no other choice but to join my colleagues. The first hijack I attended was in February 2007 when we seized a World Food Programme-chartered ship with 12 crew. I think it had the name of MV Rozen and we released it after two months, with a ransom. Now I have two lorries, a luxury car and have started my own business in town. The interview ends with the following statement: The only way the piracy can stop is if [ Somalia ] gets an effective government that can defend our fish. And then we will disarm, give our boats to that government and will be ready to work. Foreign navies can do nothing to stop piracy.[19] 5. Conclusion The conclusion should be clear: piracy will continue to exist as long as there are politically unstable regions located along important sea routes. As piracy is chiefly a result of political instability, it must be combated first of all on land.[20] This is both good and bad news for the navies currently operating near the Horn of Africa. The bad news is that the deployment of navy ships and the escorting of merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean will not bring about a decrease in piracy. With those efforts we are merely fighting the symptoms. As the Netherlands ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation informed the Dutch Parliament on March 13, 2009: Operation Allied Protector is a brief military contribution intended to combat the symptoms of piracy near the Horn of Africa while, in an international context, the transition process in Somalia and the implementation of the Djibouti agreement are being supported and a study is being conducted, through, among others, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, into how regional capacity building can contribute to countering piracy in the long term.[21] The good news is that the deployment of navy ships against Somalian pirates will continue for an indefinite period into the future. For now, the hope for peace in the region has faded and the Djibouti agreement has been consigned to the wastepaper basket. Strict Islamic groups appear to be gaining the upper hand. As has been shown by the Islamic Courts Union, such organisations will bring a certain degree of political stability, enabling the suppression of piracy. On the other hand, regimes of this kind are unacceptable to the West. The United States has recently sent 40 tonnes of weapons to Somalia . Direct intervention is, after all, an undesirable option, evidence of which is provided by 1993 US operation in Mogadishu (depicted in the movie Black Hawk Down). In my opinion, in Somalia the international community finds itself caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.[22] [1] D.J. Puchala, “Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach”, Contempory Security Policy 26 (April 2005) 1:1-24. [2] Ph. De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1. [3] “Southeast Asia Maritime Security Review, 3rd Quarter 2008” , available on the webpage of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, URL: www.rsis.edu.sg; IIAS Newsletter 36 (March, 2005); P. Gwin, “Dark Passage: The Straits of Malakka. Pirates Haunt it. Sailors Fear it. Global Trade Depends on it”, National Geographic (October, 2007) 126-149. [4] Peter Chalk, Laurence Smallman and Nicholas Burger, Countering Piracy in the Modern Era. Notes from a RAND Workshop to Discuss the Best Approaches for Dealing with Piracy in the 21st Century ( Washington : RAND Corporation, 2009). [5] “Discussion Paper Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme “Pioneering for Solutions Against Piracy” Focusing on a Geopolitical Analysis, Counter-piracy Initiatives and Policy Solutions”, available on the webpage of Clingendael, URL: www.Clingendael.nl. [6] AFP, “UN calls for multi-level approach in fighting piracy” (November 18, 2009), available on the webpage of Google: http://www.google.com. [7] A. Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450- 1850” , in C.R. Pennell (ed.), Bandits of the Sea: A Pirates Reader ( New York : New York University Press, 2001) 25. [8] Ch. Tilly, Coercian, Capital, and European States , AD 990-1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); R. Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995); P. Wilson, “European Warfare, 1450- 1815” , in J. Black (ed.), War in the Early Modern World, 1450-1815 (London: UCL Press, 1999) 177-206. [9] Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven. Een kwestie van verantwoordelijkheden (The Hague, 2007); J.M.D van Leeuwe, “De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven in operatiegebieden”, Militaire Spectator 177 (2008) 4:240-245. [10] V.W. Lunsford, Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands ( New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); J.C. Appleby, “A Nursery of Pirates: the English Pirate Community in Ireland in the Early 17th Century”, International Journal of Maritime History 2 (1990) 1:1-27; C. Senior, A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in its Heyday (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1976). [11] J. de Courcy Ireland, “Raïs Hamidou: The last of the Great Algerian Corsairs”, The Mariner’s Mirror 60 (1974) 2:187-196; D.J. Vitkus and N. Matar, Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001); D. Panzac, Barbary Corsairs: the End of a Legend, 1800-1820 (Leiden: Brill, 2005); N. Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005). [12] D. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and Reality of Life among the Pirates (New York: Harvast Book, 1995); Aaron Smith, The Atrocities of the Pirates (Guilford:The Lyons Press, 1999); J. Rogoziński, Honor among Thieves: Captain Kidd, Henry Every, and the Pirate Democracy in the Indian Ocean (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000); P. Earl, The Pirate Wars (London: Methuen, 2003). [13] J.N.F.M. à Campo, “Asymmetry, Disparity and Cyclicity: Charting the Piracy Conflict in Colonial Indonesia”, International Journal of Maritime History 19 (2007) 1:35-62; G. Teitler, A.M.C. van Dissel and J.N.F.M. à Campo, Zeeroof en zeeroofbestrijding in de Indische archipel, 19de eeuw (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005). [14] E.D. Dickinson, “Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete”, Harvard Law Review 37 (1924/5) 334-36. [15] R. Middleton, Piracy in Somalia Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars (October, 2008), available on the webpage of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, URL: www.chathamhouse.org.uk. [16] D. Nincic, “State Failure and the Re-Emergence of Maritime Piracy”, available on the webpage of All Academic Research, URL: http://www.allacademic.com. [17] J.C.A. de Meij, De Watergeuzen en de Nederlanden, 1568-1572 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1972). [18] M. Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea : Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); M. Rediker, Villains of the Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age ( London : Verso, 2004). [19] “It’s a Pirate’s Life for Me”, available on the webpage of the BBC, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8010061.stm. [20] M. Schenkel, “Los zeeroverij op aan land. Effectief gezag in Somalië is vereiste voor uitbannen van piraterij”, NRC-Handelsblad (November 22, 2008). [21] Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingsamenwerking aan Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (29 521, nr. 93) (March 13, 2009). [22] K. Lindijer, “Hoop op vrede in Somalië is alweer vervlogen. Nieuwe gevechtsronde onafwendbaar door verdeeldheid, buitenlandse inmenging en criminele belangen”, NRC-Handelsblad (May 22, 2009); M.B. Sheridan, “U.S. has sent 40 Ton of Munition to Aid Somali Governemnt”, The Washington Post (June 27, 2009); K. Lindijer, “Al-Shabaab trekt strijders van overal aan”, NRC-Handelsbla (August 6, 2009).

In Search of Captain Cook: Exploring the Man Through His Own Words

It is reasonable to assume that everything that could possibly be written on the life and achievements of Captain James Cook has been written. However, in this brief, thematic look at this enigmatic British explorer, Dan O’Sullivan advances an interesting perspective. He makes no effort to overturn the definitive work on Cook – J.C. Beaglehole’s The Life of Captain James Cook – and he happily avoids either of the two partisan extremes usually associated with the subject of 18th and 19th century exploration: hagiographic treatments or the all-explorers-are-racist-imperialists school. Sullivan wisely skirts the more recent, largely esoteric debate between Gananath Obeyesekere and Marshall Sahlin as to whether Hawaiian islanders reaction to Cook indicated a “Western” rationality.

Instead, In Search of Captain Cook returns to what are practically the only surviving records – the logs from Cook’s three voyages – and tries to present an accurate portrait of the explorer’s personality by measuring it against several situational templates: how Cook interacted with the officers and men of his ships, Cook’s contribution to science and health, and his understanding and treatment of the native peoples he encountered. The process of unraveling the “real” James Cook is complicated. Aside from the logs, a handful of surviving letters, and the recorded impressions of but a few officers and men, there are scant primary sources. The traditional picture of Cook is of an almost stereotypical hero: brave, resolute, determined, and far-sighted. Even Cook’s murder in Hawaii in 1779 has an appropriately iconic feel to it. Any sense of humor or more prosaic personal trait is simply missing from the image we have. But, as O’Sullivan points out, even the best surviving sources can be misleading. When Cook returned in 1771 from his first voyage on HM Bark Endeavor, both the Royal Navy and government were quick to appreciate the domestic public relations benefit of Cook’s words and deeds. They considered, however, that Cook’s diction needed polishing, and so the more fluent writer John Hawkesworth was hired to shepherd the book to press. Not only did Hawkesworth reword some of Cook’s more stoic and technical diary entries, but he used the works of other voyage participants (principally botanist Joseph Banks) to augment Cook, merging them all into what appeared to be a seamless whole, and presenting the completed package as the unvarnished thoughts and actions of Britain’s newest hero. The fact is that James Cook was a self-taught naval officer, not a professional writer. He recorded his log entries in such a way as to keep an accurate record of information intended to assist other ships’ captains. Talk of tides, winds, and locations in minutes, degrees, and seconds might be essential for another seaman, but were judged to be excess for the well-read target audience. Cook was displeased with the artificial result, and during the course of his next voyage (1774-1776), he kept the public end-goal in mind. Accordingly he went through several drafts of his own log entries, gradually improving as a less-technical writer. To get even close to the truth of James Cook, then, it is necessary to plumb his original words and thoughts, not those later adapted by others for public consumption. O’Sullivan’s statement that “Since Cook’s death there have been many Cooks,” refers to the praise or damnation heaped upon James Cook by authors living in different eras, with different axes to grind. It is an accurate assessment. Stripping away the myth – some of it started even in Cook’s lifetime – is a challenging business.

The author’s James Cook comes across as a human being, not a statue. He has likes and dislikes (he refers to the Malekulans of the New Hebrides, for instance, as “the most ugly and ill proportioned people I ever saw”), opinions – some of them prescient, some erroneous; he has a sense of obligation to his crew and the people he encounters; he operates from a singular sense of duty and purpose. While not afraid to flog offending sailors, he nevertheless provides intelligent leadership in places that could not be more remote or different from the Yorkshire village where he was born. Cook was in almost every sense a scientist, although even that word was unknown to his era. He understood the importance of diet on crew health but never made the critical link to citrus fruit (he advocated fresh meat and vegetables); he displayed a delicate understanding of diverse cultures, and the possible negative impact of Western society on those cultures weighed heavily on him despite his duty to make first contact. Cook makes errors, too, but generally ones that are understandable when viewed through an 18th century lens – and even his final error on Hawaii fits into this paradigm. The debate over the nature and significance of James Cook and his voyages will certainly continue. In Search of Captain Cook is a welcome addition to that search for meaning. Dan O’Sullivan, In Search of Captain Cook: Exploring the Man Through His Own Words, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2008. 233 pp., illustrations, references, suggested reading, index. Review by Mark M. Hull Department of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Operation Thunderhead: The True Story of Vietnam’s Final POW Rescue—And the Last Navy SEAL Killed in Country

The story of the American prisoners of war (POW) in Vietnam has been told many times with the definitive account being Stuart Rochester and Frederick Kiley’s Honor Bound: The History of American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973 (Naval Institute Press, 1998). This “new” POW book by Kevin Dockery re-hashes the story of John Dramesi’s ill-fated May 1969 escape attempt and ends with a coda about an aborted June 1972 U.S. Navy special operations mission to assist Dramesi in a second attempt that never happened. Air Force Captain John Dramesi was a brash young officer from South Philadelphia who in May of 1969 made a daring escape attempt from the “Zoo Annex” prison in Hanoi with fellow Air Force Captain Ed Atterberry. The two men planned to break out of the camp disguised as Vietnamese peasants, steal a sampan, and paddle down the Red River to the Gulf of Tonkin , where they hoped to be picked up by the U.S. Navy. Escaping from the prison proved to be the easiest part of the mission, but the two men never fully considered how they would be able to travel over 110 miles through hostile, heavily populated territory to the coast. The fact that neither man was of Asian heritage or spoke Vietnamese compounded their difficulties. The escape attempt occurred without the blessings of compound’s senior ranking POW, Air Force Captain Konrad Trautman. Trautman felt he could not order Dramesi and Atterbery to cancel the attempt because the Code of Conduct specifically demanded that POWs make every effort to escape, but he did believe that the attempt was ill-advised and could cause severe repercussions for other POWs held at the Zoo Annex. The two men escaped from the compound at night by crawling through an attic above the cells and clamoring down the roof of the facility to the street. A North Vietnamese patrol discovered the two men at sunup the next day in a bramble thicket about four miles from the Zoo Annex. Over the course of the next two months, the prison authorities severely tortured the two escapees plus two dozen other American POWs. One officer, Lieutenant Eugene “Red” McDaniel, received 700 lashes as well as electric shocks and a form of rope torture during the ordeal, which he called his “darkest hour.” After seven days of severe torture, Atterbery died—a death Dockery attributes to pneumonia, but which Rochester and Kiley argue had to have been caused by excessive torture and medical neglect. Dockery, a “radio broadcaster, gunsmith, and historian” and the author of a number of popular histories of the SEALs, staunchly defends Dramesi throughout the book as an American hero. But other historians of the POW experience view his actions in a more critical light. Rochester and Kiley define him as an “accident waiting to happen,” whose actions caused unnecessary pain and suffering for their fellow POWs. Operation Thunderhead also yields no new information on Dramesi or his escape, and because no sources are cited in the book, I am left wondering if Dockery even interviewed Dramesis or simply constructed his narrative from Dramesi’s memoir Code of Honor (Norton, 1975). There are also some embarrassing errors in the book, such as the misspelling Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Robinson Risner’s last name, “Reisner,” in several places in the book. A Korean War ace, Risner was one of the longest serving senior officers in the Hanoi Hilton, and the recipient of the Air Force Cross. Any historian of the American POW experience should have been able to spell his name properly. But what irritates this reviewer the most about Operation Thunderhead is the book’s misleading title. Only the last 62 pages of the book focus on the SEAL effort to assist Dramesi in a second escape bid in the spring of 1972. This portion of the book focuses solely on the SEAL operation to penetrate North Vietnamese territory, using the special operations submarine Grayback (LPSS 574). According to Dockery, the SEAL mission was plagued by problems from the very onset. During an attempt to land on an island in the Red River , a SEAL Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) ran out of battery power while fighting the strong currents of the river, forcing the 4-man SEAL and Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) crew to abort the mission, and destroy the SDV. After being rescued by helicopter and transported to Long Beach (CGN 9), the four operators attempted to return to Grayback by dropping from a helicopter and diving to the boat, but in the insertion attempt, one of the SEALs, Lieutenant Spence Dry, hit the water too hard and died, and several of the others were badly injured. A rescue helicopter eventually retrieved Dry’s corpse along with the three survivors. Communications difficulties had prevented Dry from informing Grayback of their attempted return to the boat, and so the boat launched a second SDV before their jump. This SDV, however, sunk almost immediately after launch, forcing the operators to scramble out of the vehicle and swim to the surface, where they were eventually rescued by a helicopter. The SEALs planned to make a third attempt with an inflatable boat, but this attempt was ultimately cancelled after the Grayback’s commanding officer suddenly shifted his boat’s location upon hearing chains being dragged near his boat. Dockery does not reveal his sources for this section of the book either, but presumably, he gleaned his details from interviews with some of the surviving special operations personnel. No official documents or after action reports are cited. The author also does not discuss Operation Mole—Dramesi’s second escape plan in which he and several others were to tunnel out of Hoa Lo Prison and pose as German tourists. Operation Mole was cancelled after some of the participants were transferred out of the jail, and Air Force Colonel John Flynn, the Senior Ranking Officer at the time, decided that the chances of success were minimal and the probability of severe reprisals against the other POWs, extremely high. Operation Thunderhead offers no new insights on the American POW experience during the Vietnam War and limited new material on Operation Thunderhead. It is a work of popular history of little use to serious scholars of the war in Southeast Asia . Until more official documents are released on special operations in North Vietnamese territory, this chapter of the war will remain shrouded in mystery. Kevin Dockery, Operation Thunderhead: The True Story of Vietnam’s Final POW Rescue—And the Last Navy SEAL Killed in Country, Berkley Press, 2009. 294 pp., photos, appendix, index. Review by John Darrell Sherwood Naval History and Heritage Command

Penemuan 18.808 Transaksi Aneh

TEMPO Interaktif, Jakarta: Dari 5.854.743 Laporan Transaksi Keuangan Tunai yang diterima Pusat Laporan dan Analisis Keuangan akhir Juli lalu, terdapat 18.808 di antaranya transaksi yang mencurigakan. Menurut Kepala Pusat Pelaporan, Yunus Husein, traksasksi aneh itu baru 585 yang diserakan kepada Kepolisian dan Kejaksaan. “Yang disidik Kejaksaan 18 kasus, sedangkan divonis pengadilan 19 kasus,” kata Yunus ketika membuka seminar bertajuk Mengejar Pelaku Kejahatan Perpajakan Melalui Undang-undang Anti Pencucian Uang di Balai Tiara Convention Centre, Medan, Sabtu (16/8)



Temuan itu diperoleh Pusat Pelaporan berkat informasi Egmont Group, kumpulan dari Financial Intelligent Unit atau penyedia jasa keuangan di negara lain. Pusat Pelaporan resmi menjadi anggota lembaga itu sejak Juni 2004. Dari negara lain ada 26 penyedia jasa keuangan. Adapun dari dalam negeri ada 19 Financial Intelligent Unit.

Yunus menyarankan kepada para penyidik saat menangani kejahatan perpajakan dan pencucian dilakukan dengan follow the money atau pendekatan antipencucian uang. Sekalipun dalam unjuk rasa berujung kerusuhan, menurut Yunus, dengan cara ini bisa mendeteksi dalang (pendonor) unjuk rasa . “Selain menelusuri juga menyelamatkan aset hasil kejahatan untuk negara,” kata Yunus.

Komisaris Polisi Mardiyani dari Badan Reserse Kriminal Markas Besar Kepolisian RI, mengaku adanya penghentian penyidikan kasus pencucian uang dengan alasan kurang bukti. Direktur Intelijen dan Penyidikan Direktorat Pajak, Mochamad Tjiptardjo, dan Ketua Program Studi Ilmu Hukum Universitas Sumatera Utara, Prof Binsar Nasution, hal itu tidak patut terjadi. “Karena data awal penyelidikan sudah ada,” katanya.

Juru bicara Pusat Pelaporan, Natsir Kongah, menduga penghentian penyidikan mungkin adanya perlindungan dari oknum penyidik. Persengkongkolan itu bisa terjadi dan dapat dideteksi dengan cara mendekati aset oknum tersebut. “Contoh mobil yang dia beli atas namanya tapi dibayar orang atau perusahaan lain,” ujar Natsir. Soal temuan Pusat Pelaporan, Natsir mengatakan tidak dapat mempubliskasikannya kepada pers, rekening siapa saja yang dicurigai. “Kami tidak memiliki kewenangan menyidik.”

Salah satu kasus rekening aneh adalah transaksi misterius di BNI Cabang Karawang, Jawa Barat. Terekam seseorang bernama Yudi Hermawan mendepositokan US$ 500 ribu, yang dikonversikan menjadi Rp 4,59 miliar. Si pemilik rekening tak menjelaskan dari mana duit segudang itu ia peroleh.

Sigit Purnomo, Kepala BNI Cabang Karawang, mencium sesuatu yang aneh. Ia hafal betul sosok-sosok yang biasa menyetor dana jumbo. "Mereka biasanya pengusaha pompa bensin atau juragan beras," katanya kepada Tempo. Dan Yudi Hermawan, warga Desa Sinarsari, Rengasdengklok, Karawang, Jawa Barat, hanyalah pegawai pajak golongan tiga.

Sigit melapor ke kantor pusat, dan dari situ informasinya diteruskan ke Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan. Sejak itu, aktivitas rekening nomor 119611235 milik Yudi di Bank BNI Cabang Karawang tersebut dipantau. Ternyata deposito Rp 4,59 miliar itu cuma bertahan 32 hari. Yudi telah memindahkan Rp 4 miliar ke rekening deposito yang baru dibuka atas namanya. Sekitar Rp 390 juta dimasukkan ke rekening tabungan bersama bunganya, Rp 20 juta, juga masih atas nama Yudi. Sebagian yang lain diambil tunai.

Pelacakan dilanjutkan Pusat Pelaporan dengan meminta bantuan Kepolisian Daerah Jawa Barat. Menurut Direktur Reserse Kriminal Kepolisian Daerah Jawa Barat Komisaris Besar Ari Dono Sukmanto, penyelidikan dimulai awal Maret lalu. Polisi menduga dana besar itu terkait dengan posisi Yudi selaku pegawai pajak. “Ada indikasi penyalahgunaan wewenang dan kejahatan money laundering,” ujar Ari.

Pada 8 April lalu, Yudi Hermawan ditetapkan sebagai tersangka dan ditahan. Polisi mengira pria 37 tahun itu tak mengerti Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang. Yudi diduga tanpa pikir panjang memasukkan uang miliaran rupiah secara tunai atas namanya sendiri. Lazimnya dalam kasus money laundering, pelaku menyembunyikan jejaknya dengan memakai nama orang lain, yayasan, atau badan sosial.Yudi memilih bungkam ketika dicecar soal asal-usul uang. ”Dia hanya bilang uang itu dari hamba Allah." kata Ari.

Pengacara Yudi, Jurizal Dwi, mengatakan uang Rp 4,59 miliar itu sumbangan seseorang yang tidak ingin identitasnya dibeberkan. Dana tersebut untuk sumbangan sebuah pesantren di Kerawang. Antara lain dipakai buat membebaskan lahan, membeli sawah, dan membangun gedung. Sebagian lagi dipakai untuk membayar honor guru. "Sisanya tak sampai ratusan juta rupiah," kata Jurizal.

Saat ini yang masih ditunggu oleh masyarakat bagaimana follow up-nya??

by Elik Susanto, Soetana Monang Hasibuan

Posisi RI dalam The New7Sisters *)*)

Apa kehebatan Malaysia dengan Petronas-nya sehingga dengan cadangan migas yang kalah jauh dari Indonesia masuk dalam The New7Sisters

Berbeda dengan pemilihan Komodo sebagai "The New7Wonders" yang kontroversial, komite pemilihan "The New7Sisters" (N7S), yang dikoordinasi oleh majalah Financial Times, tidak menggunakan model voting melalui SMS terbanyak. Penilaian "keajaiban" lebih menitikberatkan pada kriteria penguasaan cadangan migas, tingkat produksi, dan pengembangan usaha dari perusahaan minyak kelas dunia yang telah berhasil menggeser posisi kehormatan "The Old7Sisters".

Komite berhasil memilih kelompok The New7Sisters, yang terdiri atas Saudi Aramco, Gazprom (Rusia), CNPC (Cina), NIOC (Iran), PDVSA (Venezuela), Petrobras (Brasil), dan Petronas (Malaysia). Tujuh perusahaan minyak nasional itu menguasai lebih dari sepertiga cadangan serta produksi minyak dan gas dunia. Bandingkan dengan seven sisters yang lama (BP, Shell, dan lainnya), yang kini hanya mengontrol 3 persen cadangan dan 10 persen produksi migas dunia. Sayang, perusahaan negara "wakil" dari Indonesia telah tereliminasi sejak babak awal, diyakini karena dukungan "sponsor" yang setengah hati. Posisi perusahaan minyak nasional berhasil menjadi perusahaan kelas dunia terutama karena adanya dukungan dan perlakuan khusus dari negara sebagai sponsor utama.

Republik Indonesia sebagai "sponsor" perusahaan minyak nasional boleh meniru semangat, idealisme, dan kesungguhan negara-negara yang telah mengantar perusahaan minyak nasionalnya menjadi world class company dalam waktu relatif singkat, terlepas dari kontroversi politik negaranya. Sebagai sumber inspirasi bagi RI, di bawah ini ada kisah dua negara berkembang yang sukses mengantar perusahaan minyak nasionalnya masuk N7S dengan dua orientasi yang berbeda. Dua negara itu adalah Venezuela, yang mewakili "garis keras" dengan orientasi sumber daya dalam negeri, dan Malaysia, yang mewakili "garis moderat" dengan orientasi luar negeri karena sumber daya di dalam negeri relatif kecil.

Disadari banyak kelemahan dan karut-marut di wajah perusahaan minyak nasional, tapi jasa mereka bagi bangsa dan negara tidak terbilang, terutama pada saat negara dalam keadaan krisis. Pada 1970-an, migas selalu menjadi lokomotif penarik gerbong ekonomi Indonesia melalui kontribusi anggaran pendapatan dan belanja negara lebih dari 70 persen. Pada krisis ekonomi 1997-1998, migas menjadi penyelamat ekonomi Indonesia. Kini, walaupun Indonesia sudah menjadi nett oil importer dan porsi penerimaan migas di APBN tinggal sekitar 20 persen, keberadaan sektor migas masih sangat dibutuhkan oleh rakyat Indonesia. Pada masa prihatin, dibutuhkan keberadaan perusahaan minyak nasional yang lebih kuat. Momen revisi Undang-Undang Migas adalah saat yang tepat bagi RI untuk mulai menunjukkan keberpihakan kepada perusahaan minyak nasional.

Melawan hegemoni sebagian publik mengira bahwa cadangan minyak terbesar di dunia dikuasai Arab Saudi. Namun dua bulan yang lalu OPEC mengumumkan kini Venezuela yang menguasai cadangan minyak terbesar di dunia, yaitu 296,5 miliar barel (bandingkan dengan cadangan Indonesia sebesar 3,9 miliar barel). Perusahaan minyak nasional Venezuela, PDVSA, salah satu anggota N7S, menjadi perusahaan minyak terbesar keempat di dunia berdasarkan data cadangan terbukti, produksi, pengilangan, dan penjualan.

Sejatinya, sejak 1990-an, Venezuela, melalui PDVSA, telah membuka diri untuk bekerja sama dengan perusahaan minyak asing melalui joint ventures dan operating agreements. Namun, melihat perkembangan perusahaan minyak nasional yang kurang menggembirakan, pada Februari 2007 Presiden Chavez mendeklarasikan aturan baru, yaitu nasionalisasi" (lebih tepat disebut "renegosiasi"), bagi semua perusahaan minyak asing di Venezuela.

Dalam aturan yang berlaku mulai 1 Mei 2007 itu, Chavez "mengimbau" semua perusahaan asing untuk melakukan negosiasi ulang atas seluruh kontrak di mana mensyaratkan perusahaan nasional PDVSA menguasai saham minimal 60 persen, termasuk kontrak ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Statoil, ConocoPhillips, BP, dan lainnya. Mempertimbangkan cadangan yang berlimpah, akhirnya semua perusahaan minyak asing menerima ketentuan baru tersebut. Hanya dua perusahaan yang mengajukan permohonan banding ke pengadilan, yaitu ExxonMobil dan ConocoPhillips, tapi akhirnya mereka juga menyerah.

Presiden Chavez mengontrol langsung aturan baru itu demi mengangkat peran perusahaan minyak nasional PDVSA. Sayang, kini Chavez dalam keadaan sakit serius. Diperkirakan Washington tidak tinggal diam. Perusahaan minyak asing menunggu dengan harap-harap cemas datangnya momen perubahan yang lebih menguntungkan bagi bisnis dan negara asal mereka, terutama Amerika Serikat.

Nasionalisme Mahathir
Berjayanya Petronas, yang didirikan pada 1974, tidak lepas dari jasa pemerintah Malaysia, terutama tekad Perdana Menteri Mahathir Mohamad mengusung Petronas mulai dalam negeri hingga jauh ke mancanegara sehingga layak terpilih masuk kelompok N7S, kendati sumber daya migas di dalam negeri relatif sangat kecil.

Salah satu strategi unik Mahathir dalam membesarkan perusahaan minyak nasional adalah memanfaatkan sentimen keagamaan untuk mendekati negara-negara Islam yang tergabung dalam OKI di Timur Tengah dan Afrika. Pendekatan gaya primordial ini mendapat sambutan luar biasa, sehingga Petronas memperoleh banyak konsesi migas dalam waktu singkat. Walaupun cara ini banyak ditentang oleh negara-negara Barat, Mahathir tidak peduli dan tetap konsisten. Bandingkan dengan Indonesia. Kendati memiliki penduduk Islam terbesar di dunia, RI tidak cukup memiliki keberanian untuk mengangkat perusahaan minyak nasional ke pentas dunia dengan gaya Mahathir.

Strategi unik lain yang ditempuh adalah mendekati negara-negara yang dianggap "bermasalah", baik oleh negara-negara Barat, terutama Amerika, maupun oleh organisasi kemanusiaan. Negara-negara "bermasalah" itu contohnya Iran, Sudan, dan Myanmar. Malaysia disambut dengan tangan terbuka dan Petronas berhasil menguasai beberapa konsesi di negara-negara "bermasalah" tersebut. Kini Petronas merambah konsesi migas di mancanegara di lebih dari 30 negara (termasuk Blok East Natuna di Indonesia), yang berhasil masuk Global 500 (peringkat ke-86) dengan keuntungan bersih pada 2010 mencapai US$ 17,48 miliar.

Bagaimana dengan RI?
Rakyat menunggu tampilnya pemimpin Indonesia yang benar-benar mempunyai political will untuk membesarkan perusahaan minyak nasional di dalam dan luar negeri. Sayang bila Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral yang baru dan wakilnya bangga hanya menjadi safe players dan membiarkan perusahaan negara berjuang sendirian menjadi flag carrier Indonesia.

Kini saatnya RI mengangkat perusahaan minyak nasional agar dapat memberikan kontribusi yang lebih besar bagi bangsa dan negara. Pelajaran berharga dari tokoh-tokoh seperti Chavez dan Mahathir serta kelompok New7Sisters dapat dikaji, terutama idealisme dan political will mereka untuk membesarkan perusahaan minyak nasional.

Indonesia tidak harus mengekor gaya Chavez atau Mahathir. Indonesia harus mencari cara yang lebih elegan disesuaikan dengan tingkat sumber daya dan risiko, baik geopolitik maupun ekonomi, serta iklim investasi. Indonesia dapat mulai menunjukkan keberpihakan dengan menyerahkan pengelolaan lapangan migas yang habis masa kontraknya kepada perusahaan minyak nasional.

Jangan takut memberikan hak istimewa kepada perusahaan milik negara, seperti layaknya negara berdaulat RI berkewajiban mengantarkannya menjadi world class company tanpa harus terlalu khawatir dibayangi ancaman "kekuatan" di belakang perusahaan minyak asing. Sepanjang tingkat keuntungan mereka di Indonesia wajar dan berkeadilan, diyakini mereka tidak akan lari meninggalkan Indonesia.

Salah satu jalan pintas mengangkat industri migas nasional adalah membesarkan perusahaan minyak nasional sekaligus mendekatkan posisi flag carrier RI menuju The New 7 Sisters.


*) Disarikan dari tulisan Eddy Purwanto, Mantan Deputi BP Migas

Ozon Naik Pertanda Gempa

Beberapa binatang dilaporkan menunjukkan perilaku aneh beberapa saat menjelang terjadinya gempa. Anjing terus menyalak, burung berkumpul rapat dengan kawanannya, serta kodok menghilang dari kolamnya. Sebenarnya apa yang tertangkap indera mereka dan luput dari kemampuan indera manusia?

Pertanyaan itu mengantarkan sekelompok fisikawan University of Virginia di Amerika mulai menumbuk batu dan mengukur gas dalam laboratorium eksperimen yang dirancang untuk meniru gempa bumi dan melihat apa yang mungkin memicu binatang itu berlaku aneh.



Apa yang mereka temukan sangat mengejutkan. Batuan yang mereka gerus ternyata menghasilkan gas ozon pada level 100 kali lipat lebih tinggi daripada kabut asap yang menyelimuti kota Los Angeles.

“Bahkan pecahan batuan terkecil pun menghasilkan ozon,” kata Catherine Dukes, anggota tim peneliti. “Pertanyaan selanjutnya, apakah gas itu juga terdeteksi di lingkungan?”

Jika jawabannya “benar,” sinyal ozon yang dilihat oleh Dukes dan timnya mungkin dapat digunakan untuk memberi peringatan dini dalam mengantisipasi gempa yang akan terjadi.

Tim Dukes menguji sejumlah tipe batuan metamorf dan batuan beku di laboratorium, termasuk basalt, granit, gneiss dan rhyolite. Beragam jenis batuan tersebut menyusun 95 persen kerak bumi.

Batuan yang digerus menghasilkan ozon pada level antara 100 ppb hingga 10 ppm. Kandungan ozone dalam batu itu lebih tinggi ketimbang kadar gas itu di sekitarnya, yang dapat bervariasi mulai dari 40 ppb di daerah pinggiran sampai lebih dari 100 ppb di pusat kota.

Bagaimana batuan itu memproduksi ozon masih belum jelas, namun tampaknya disebabkan perbedaan muatan listrik antara permukaan batu rekahan. Elektron dari permukaan batu bermuatan memecah molekul oksigen di udara, yang berkumpul kembali membentuk ozon di permukaan tanah.

“Mirip seperti sambaran kilat mini,” kata Dukes.

Bila studi tim University of Virginia mengukur kadar ozon di tanah, kelompok ilmuwan lain menemukan adanya peningkatan ozon di atmosfer ketika gempa besar. Setelah gempa Haiti pada 2010, Ramesh Singh, geofisikawan dari Chapman University, menggunakan satelit untuk mendeteksi peningkatan level ozon dalam beberapa hari pasca gempa.

Tak diketahui apakah ozon itu berasal dari rekahan batu, seperti hasil eksperimen University of Virginia, namun beragam observasi akan membantu ilmuwan mengungkap proses fisika fenomena itu.
“Apa yang mereka lihat pada skala kecil di laboratorium mungkin dapat menjelaskan pengukuran yang kami peroleh lewat satelit,” kata Singh, “namun seluruh bumi ini adalah sistem dari sistem yang sangat rumit.”

LIVESCIENCE | TJANDRA (Tempo Interaktif)